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Introduction 
 
 
 
This research finds its roots in two main ideas.  
First of all, a large body of literature has shown that institutions are key determinants of 
economic development, and Acemoglu (2003) defines them as one of the fundamental causes 
of economic growth. Differences in institutions help understanding different paths of 
economic development and contribute to determine why certain areas reach economic 
prosperity and other areas do not. 
In second instance, an interesting new-born field of literature has proved that history matters 
for the economic development of an area. This literature presents the intriguing idea that 
modern economies are affected by past institutions even after the institutions have ceased to 
exist (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).  
Interestingly, past institutions can have long lasting effects on economic achievements of a 
country through different means.  
Institutions that have ceased to exist can affect modern economic development through their 
impact on current institutions. Several papers identify the origins of heterogeneity of 
economic achievements in certain parts of the world in colonization, proving that different 
colonial institutions led to different institutional outcomes in modern times (Acemoglu, 2001; 
Engermann and Sokoloff, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997). 
Other studies evidence how past institutions can also have an effect on culture, values and 
beliefs (Becker et al., 2016; Bukowski, 2015; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2013).  
This research aims at investigating whether evidence in this sense, that is, of an effect of past 
institutions on culture and values, can be found also in the Italian case. In particular we are 
focusing on the effects of pre-unity institutions on modern municipalities.  
Putnam (1993) indicates the presence of a decisive discontinuity between centre and north 
Italy and south Italy, in terms of both economic development and institutional performance.  
Indeed, in the Seventies all Italian regions were introduced to the same new institutional 
model, composed by national and local bodies, regions and provinces, but after small time 
new institutions showed different levels of performance (Almagisti, 2016). Italian local 
heterogeneity in terms of economic and social achievements constitutes a unique framework 
for research on regional development.  
Some papers try to address the issue from a historic point of view (Putnam, 1993; Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales, 2013; Felice, 2010; Cappelli, 2015), but little as been discussed about 
lasting effects of pre-unity institutions, in the period comprising 16th and 17th Centuries, just 
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until unification. Putnam (1993), for example, argues that Italian heterogeneity and the 
difference in performance between northern and southern regions derives from different 
allocations of social capital. The author identifies the origin of different endowments of social 
capital in historic contingencies characterizing Italy in 11th and 12th Centuries. 
This paper tries to fill the lack of empirical evidence regarding pre-unity institutions, arguing 
that also institutional framework in pre-unity States may have had lasting effects in different 
terms. 
In particular, the experience of Papal States is peculiar among other pre-unity States, as the 
mixture of political and spiritual power characterizes it. Like in Becker et al. (2016), 
Bukowski (2015), Dell (2010), we choose to implement Regression Discontinuity Design that 
evaluates the effect of Italian pre-unity institutions on a discontinuous jump at the historic 
borders of pre-unity States. We use a dummy to express former Papal States affiliation and 
run Regression Discontinuity Design with municipalities lying on the either side of the 
borders respectively with Duchies of Parma, Modena and Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and Tuscany. 
In the first part of the research we investigate whether the experience of inefficient institutions 
in former Papal States territories has lead people to develop an opposition to clergy and 
religion that went beyond politics, towards ethical matters. We use the proportion of votes 
favourable to divorce in 1974 and the proportion of religious marriages over total marriages 
as measures of the attitude towards religion. We show that former Papal States affiliation is 
associated with significantly higher proportion of votes favourable to divorce and 
significantly lower proportion of religious marriages, supporting our hypothesis of a reaction 
against the imposition of religiosity on lay society. 
Secondly, we investigate the effects of pre-unity institutions on social capital. We provide 
new evidence on the issue of different endowments of social capital among different parts of 
Italy, as discussed by Putnam (1993), Almagisti (2016), Boix and Posner (1996), Felice, 
(2007, 2010, 2011), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004).  
We make experiments on both social capital as political participation and civic engagement. 
We use as measures of political participation the voter turnout in 1974 and 2011 referendum, 
while the presence of no profit organizations and the number of volunteers as measures of 
civic engagement. There is evidence of significantly different endowments of social capital 
among municipalities lying on different sides of the borders. In particular former Papal States 
affiliation is associated with higher vote participation with respect to northern pre-unity states 
and Kingdom of the two Sicilies. As regards no profit organizations, used as measures of 
civic engagement, former Papal States affiliation is associated with significantly lower civic 
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engagement than Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia and Duchies, but significantly higher civic 
engagement with respect to Kingdom of the two Sicilies. 
Finally, we investigate educational attainment by testing whether former Papal States 
affiliation is associated with different educational qualification rates. This latter experiment is 
inspired by Bukowski’s (2015) experiment on education regarding historical Partitions of 
Poland. Evidence from this last experiment shows significant differences in educational 
attainment among different parts of Italy, but as we will se, the interpretation of results is not 
straightforward. 
Baseline models are integrated by robustness checks as within region models and the 
introduction of a multiple Regression Discontinuity Design model that considers two Papal 
States borders jointly. 
The rest of the work is organised as follows: first, a review of the literature about the effects 
of history on economic development and of its three main fields (geography, culture, 
institutions) is performed; secondly, I provide historical background of pre-unity Italy; third, 
methodology is explained; finally, results are presented for every outcome separately.  
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1. Theoretical Background 
 
1.1 Literature: history and growth, a general picture 
 
 
A growing body of literature points towards the importance of history for economic 
development. Empirical evidence produced by these studies shows that historical 
contingencies or events can have long lasting effects on many outcomes of interest.  
This study contributes to the field of literature that shows how history can have long-lasting 
effects through its impact on current formal institutions or on values, beliefs and cultural 
norms. 
The origins of this line of literature can be traced to three lines of research that began around 
one decade ago, all of the three investigating colonial rule. Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997,2002) examine the importance of factor endowments together with colonial rule in 
order to understand the subsequent economic development of American colonies. Acemoglu 
(2001) tries to better evidence the origins of current institutions and their importance for 
economic development. Finally La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) focused on legal institutions 
implemented by different colonizers and their long-term consequences. 
Generally speaking, history can affect development through different channels, as it is 
embedded in factors which are considered fundamental causes of economic growth and 
prosperity: institutions, geography and culture (Acemoglu, 2007).  
Fundamental causes of growth are different from proximate causes like physical and human 
capital, technology, and markets. These factors are instead associated to questions like why 
poor places in the world don’t have better markets, better human capital, more investments, 
and better machinery and technology (Acemoglu, 2003). 
In this first part of the work I provide a summary of this body of empirical research studying 
the effects of history on economic development, for each of the three fundamental causes of 
prosperity.  
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1.1.1 Geography 
 
 
Geography is crucial in understanding the development of a Country, as it naturally 
determines the areas that are more favourable than others to economic activity.  
Geography is, together with institutions, the main candidate to explain the fundamental causes 
of differences in prosperity between countries (Acemoglu, 2003). According to the 
institutions hypothesis some societies have good institutions that encourage investment in 
machinery, human capital, and better technology, achieving economic prosperity. On the 
other hand, according to the geography hypothesis, climate and ecology of a society shape 
both its technology and the incentives of its inhabitants, and emphasizes forces of nature as a 
primary factor in the poverty of nations. Resource constraints, physical geography, geopolitics 
have necessarily to be taken into consideration to explain the development of an area.  
Literature following the geography hypothesis shows that levels of per capita income, 
economic growth, and other economic and demographic dimensions are strongly correlated 
with geographical and ecological variables such as climate zone, disease ecology, and 
distance from the coast (Sachs, 2003). Geography effect may work through direct channels 
such as effects on productivity, population growth, trade or investment, or indirect channels, 
such as effects on the choice of political and economic institutions.  
The relationship between geography and institutions is still being investigated: geographic 
factors might be associated with institutions and economic performance either because they 
directly shape the sorts of institutions that evolve and thus indirectly affect performance or 
because they have a direct effect on economic performance, which in turn affects the quality 
of institutions (Engerman and Sokolof, 2002). 
In an environment in which capital and people can move around with relative ease, the 
disadvantages of adverse geography, such as physical isolation, endemic disease, or other 
local problems, are magnified (Sachs, 2003), and adverse conditions can prevent the 
attractiveness for foreign capital inflows. Disease for example dramatically lowers the returns 
on foreign investment and raises transaction costs for international trade, migration and 
tourism. Sachs (2003) for example focuses on malaria transmission, which is also strongly 
related to climate conditions. The author provides an instrumental variable for malaria risk, 
computed as an ecologically-based variable which is built upon climatological and vector 
conditions on a country-by-country basis, and is therefore exogenous to public health 
interventions and economic conditions. By using this instrument he is able to show that 
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regions where there is a high risk of malaria transmission have lower per capita income that 
non-malarious regions, after controlling for the quality of government institutions. 
Other scholars highlight how different paths in economic performance could be rooted in the 
indirect effects that geography and factor endowments may have on the way institutions 
evolve. These authors argue that the roots of economic disparities and inequalities lay in 
differences in the initial factor endowments.  
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) study American economies and claim that the factor 
endowments at the time of colonization were reflected in colonizer policies and had enduring 
impacts on the structure of colonial economies and ultimately on their long-term paths of 
institutional and economic development. While all colonies began with an abundance of land 
and other resources, other aspects of their factor endowments varied, contributing to 
substantial differences among them in the distribution of landholdings, wealth, and political 
power. Some, like the Caribbean, Brazil, or the southern colonies on the North American 
mainland, had climates and soil conditions well suited for growing crops, like sugar, coffee, 
rice, tobacco and cotton that were of high value on the market and more efficiently produced 
on large plantations with slave labour. An economy based on slavery served to generate a 
vastly unequal distribution of wealth and political power. In contrast, small family farms were 
the rule in the northern colonies of the North American mainland, where climatic conditions 
favoured a regime of mixed farming centred on grains and livestock, which exhibited no 
economies of scale in production. The circumstances in these regions encouraged the 
evolution of more equal distributions of wealth, more democratic political institutions and the 
pursuit of more growth-oriented policies.  
The study is primarily qualitative in nature, and rather than identifying a direct effect of 
geography, underlines how crucial is the joint action of geography, natural endowments and 
institutions.  
However findings from comparative studies of suffrage, public land, schooling, and other 
institutions in the perhaps limited context of the Americas are consistent with the notion that 
those societies that began with more extreme inequality or heterogeneity in the population 
were more likely to develop structures that advantaged members of elite classes by providing 
them with relatively more political influence or access to economic opportunities (Engerman 
and Sokoloff, 2002).  
The clear implication is that institutions should not always be presumed to be exogenous, but 
economists need to learn more about where they come from to understand their relation to 
economic development. 
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1.1.2 Institutions 
 
 
Historical circumstances and events can shape the state and evolution of formal institutions 
that survive and affect economic interactions and outcomes today (North, 1990).  
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions 
and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Together with 
the standard constraints of economics they define the choice set and therefore determine 
transaction and production costs and hence the profitability and feasibility of engaging in 
economic activity (North, 1991). A further distinction can ben made between economic 
institutions, such as property rights and entry barriers, shaping economic incentives, and 
political institutions, such as form of government, shaping political incentives and the 
distribution of political power (Acemoglu, 2007).  
Institutions, domestic institutions in particular, may have a permanent effect on the 
subsequent development of an area. Countries with better institutions, more secure property 
rights and less distortionary policies, will invest more in physical and human capital and will 
use these factors more efficiently to achieve a greater level of income (North and Thomas, 
1973, Jones, 1981, North, 1981). But at the same time, there are no compelling reasons to 
think that societies will naturally gravitate toward good institutions. Institutions not only 
affect the economic prospects of nations, but also are central to the distribution of income 
among individuals and groups in society. This perspective implies that a potential change 
from dysfunctional and bad institutions toward better ones that will increase the size of the 
social pie may nonetheless be blocked when such a change significantly reduces the slice that 
powerful groups receive from the pie and when they cannot be credibly compensated for this 
loss (Acemoglu, 2003).  
It is difficult to isolate exogenous sources of variation in institutions to estimate their effect on 
performance. Scholars were able to find one in European colonization of the globe, which 
started in the sixteenth century. These papers focus on the lasting impact that colonization had 
on the development paths of the colonies through institutions.  
In their famous paper, Acemoglu et al. (2001) estimate the impact of institutions on economic 
performance using mortality rates expected by the first European settlers in the colonies as a 
source of exogenous variation in institutions, using a two stage least squares model.  
The authors identify two sets of institutions, characterized by different colonization policies: 
“extractive states”, exemplified by the Belgian colonization of Congo, which did not 
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introduce much protection for private property, did not provide checks and balances against 
government expropriation, and were detrimental to investment and economic progress; on the 
other side, the “Neo-Europes”, where colonizers tried to replicate European institutions with 
emphasis on private property and checks against government power which enforced the rule 
of law and encouraged investment (Acemoglu et al., 2001). The colonization strategy was 
influenced by the feasibility of settlements, and extractive states were settled in areas with 
unfavourable environmental conditions, which can be measured through mortality rates. 
There is a high correlation between mortality rates faced by soldiers, bishops, and sailors in 
the colonies and European settlements; between European settlements and early measures of 
institutions; and between early institutions and institutions today. The authors estimate large 
effects of institutions on income per capita using this source of variation, a relationship not 
driven by outliers and robust to controls for latitude, climate, current disease environment, 
religion, natural resources, soil quality, ethno-linguistic fragmentation, and current racial 
composition. 
The elegance of the paper lies in its ability to develop a clear and convincing historical 
narrative with supporting empirical evidence and to show how an historic event can affect 
past institutions, which through their persistence have an influence on income levels today 
(Nunn, 2009). 
Further evidence comes from Dell (2010), studying the long lasting effects of mining labour 
system in South America, and Lee and Schultz (2012) studying the effects of English and 
French colonization of Cameroon. 
Not only institutions can affect future economic development, as shown in Acemoglu (2001), 
Dell (2010), Lee and Schultz (2012), but also they can even persist over time, even through 
centuries, through different channels. Cultural evolution in this sense may also be closely 
interrelated to institutional development (Greif, 2006; Greif and Tabellini, 2010).  
Becker (2016) provides an example of this relationship, proving that even if whole empires 
themselves perish, they can leave a lasting legacy in cultural norms and the ensuing 
functioning of state institutions several generations after their formal institutions have ceased 
to exist (Becker et al., 2016).  
In particular, he finds that the Habsburg empire, characterized by a relatively decentralized, 
honest, and widely accepted state bureaucracy, still affects trust and corruption in local public 
services in Central and Eastern Europe today, even if it went down in 1918. Results show that 
individuals living in a community that used to be affiliated with the Habsburg Empire have 
greater trust in institutions and are less likely to use corruption when interacting with public 
local administration. These results are important for the understanding of the origins and 
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maintenance of collective action in general, because trust in the key institutions of the state 
and their proper functioning is crucial in facilitating collective action (Ostrom, 1998 as).  
As regards channels through which the Habsburg affiliation persists, in the models the authors 
use additional control variables at individual and household level, which are potentially 
affected by past Habsburg affiliation. Habsburg Empire might have affected levels of income 
and wealth as well as education, urbanization and fertility, so these variables might be 
channels through which the Habsburg effect comes about. However, results show that the 
effect of having been part of Habsburg Empire is hardly affected by these controls. The 
authors conclude that in the case of the Habsburg Empire, history matters for current attitudes 
and behaviour not because formal institutions persisted, but because individual cultural norms 
with regard to local public services survived. 
Bukowski (2015) provides further evidence on the persistence of institutions, in particular in 
education. The author shows that the legacy in terms of attitude towards education systems 
can persist over time through generational transmission, providing evidence coming from the 
Partitions of Poland (1815-1918). 
The methodology used in Becker et al., (2016), Bukowski (2015), Dell (2010), Lee and 
Schultz (2012), will be discussed later, regarding Regression Discontinuity Design. 
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1.1.3 Culture 
 
 
The third fundamental cause of growth is found in culture.  
Culture can be defined as a relatively fixed characteristic of a group or nation affecting 
beliefs, preferences and norms of behaviour. Old and new literature studies culture, and how 
it can affect human behaviour and economic activity. In particular religion and ethics is a 
fundamental part of the cultural background of a territory or a population, and is the main 
focus for the purpose of this study. A broad context of papers studies the association between 
religion and economic outcomes. 
The idea that culture and norms of behaviour may be a channel through which history can 
affect long-term economic development is not new. In the first years of the twentieth century 
Max Weber (1930), in one of the most renowned and controversial works of modern social 
science, “The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism”, attributed the higher economic 
prosperity of Protestant regions to a Protestant work ethic made of individualism and 
appreciation of worldly achievements.  
Becker and Woessman (2009) respond to the sociological interpretations that Protestant ethic 
induced its followers to work harder with an alternative economic theory based on standard 
human capital models. The authors argue that Protestantism affected economic activity in 
Prussia by increasing education through the precept of personal reading of the Bible. In fact, 
Martin Luther explicitly favoured universal schooling in order to enable all Christians to read 
the Bible by themselves, and Protestant regions benefited of the higher prevalence of public 
schools. The ensuing literacy rate among Protestants was then favourable to economic 
activity.  
In order to test this hypothesis, the authors first estimate the effect of Protestantism on literacy 
rates using distance from Wittenberg, the epicentre of reformation, as an instrument for 
Protestantism. The authors obtain significant results, proving that Protestantism indeed led to 
higher literacy rates across Prussian countries in the nineteenth century. Secondly, economic 
outcomes are considered. There is a positive casual effect between share of Protestants and 
economic outcomes, but this effect disappears when controlling for the share of literates. 
Finally, a three stage least squares model is developed, using jointly relationship between 
distance from Wittenberg and share of Protestants, Protestantism and share of literates, 
literacy and economic progressiveness.  
The authors conclude that Weber was right in the observation that Protestant regions were 
economically more affluent than Catholic ones, across countries in 1900 and within Prussia in 
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the second half of nineteenth century (Becker, Woesmann 2009), but he was likely wrong in 
identifying the channel through which this pattern arises. 
Nunziata and Rocco (2015) offer a new perspective to answer the question whether 
Protestantism is more favourable than Catholicism to economic activity.  
A major issue in investigating the economic implications of religious ethics is that self-
identification does not necessarily imply internalization of its ethical content, so the 
indications derived from a simple comparison of individuals’ reported affiliations might be 
misleading (Nunziata and Rocco, 2015).  
In order to fully understand the economic implications of a certain religious affiliation the 
authors choose to compare groups of minorities of Protestants and Catholics. Minority groups 
are likely to have a stronger adhesion to religious norms and ethics for a number of reasons: 
religion, along with language, history and culture, is an important element of people’s 
identity, which may explain the willingness of minorities to defend their religious identities 
against the influence of the majority (Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001; Bisin, Topa and Verdier, 
2004); secondly, a minority religion’s clergy works harder to preserve its followers than does 
the clergy of a majority religion (Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone, 1995; Finke and Stark, 1998); 
finally, given that following a minority religion implies continuous pressure from surrounding 
dominant religions, membership can be justified only if the attachment to the faith is 
particularly strong.  
Switzerland is an optimal set for the experiment, as it is an homogenous territory as regards 
economic conditions, and it hosts a variety of combinations of Protestant and Catholic 
minorities and majorities which are historically determined and with an almost perfect 
persistence over time. Using individual level data from Swiss census between 1970 and 2000, 
the authors are able to exploit the strong adhesion of religious minorities to their confessions’ 
ethical principles to find that Protestantism is associated with a significantly higher propensity 
for entrepreneurship. Findings indicate that adherence to Protestant ethical principles 
increases the probability that an individual will be an entrepreneur by somewhat between 1.5 
and 3.6 percentage points with respect to Catholics, after controlling for many individual-
level characteristics.  
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1.2 Regression Discontinuity Design 
 
 
Regression discontinuity design (RDD) was introduced in the Sixties as a way of estimating 
treatment effects in a non experimental setting where treatment is determined by whether an 
observed “assignment” variable (“forcing” or “running” variable) exceeds a known cut-off 
point. Since the late Nineties, a growing number of studies have relied on RD designs to 
estimate program effects in a wide variety of economic contexts.  
The main idea behind the setting is that observations just below the cut-off are good 
comparisons to those just above the cut-off. This comes of course with two relevant 
hypotheses. First, the assignment variable cannot be manipulated; if this is true, RD captures 
randomized variation which is not assumed but comes directly from the inability to precisely 
control the assignment variable near the cut-off point (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).  
Second, randomization around the cut-off implies that all other covariates should have the 
same distribution just above and below the cut-off. In other words, an RD design is 
appropriate if it is plausible that all other factors are continuously related to the assignment 
variable, because if other variables jump at the cut-off, the estimated effect will be potentially 
biased. The continuity assumption is necessary and cannot be tested, just as the identification 
assumption for the instrumental variable strategy.  
RD designs thus locally approximate randomized experiments. With respect to RD designs, 
other techniques like instrumental variable or difference-in-difference need to make further 
assumptions about both exogeneity of the treatment and relationship of other covariates with 
the treatment and outcome variables (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).  
In any RD design the estimation relies on assumptions about the relationship between the 
outcome and assignment variable near the cutoff point. Recently, researchers have begun to 
relax functional form assumption by using nonparametric or semiparametric approaches 
(Papay et al., 2011). A nonparametric procedure is essentially a local linear regression using 
data points close to the cut-off, after having determined an optimal bandwidth around the 
cutoff. If it is true that an incorrect parametric functional form in a parametric procedure will 
lead to biased estimators, a nonparametric procedure will also lead to bias unless the 
underlying function is exactly linear in the area being examined. There may be some 
functions where a low-order polynomial is a very good approximation and produces little or 
no bias, and therefore it is efficient to use all data points, both close and far away from the 
cutoff, in a parametric procedure. In other situations, a polynomial may be a bad 
approximation, and smaller biases will occur with a local linear regression. In practice, 
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parametric and nonparametric approaches lead to the computation of the same statistic. (Lee 
and Lemieux, 2010). As it is impossible to know which procedure leads to the smallest bias, 
Lee and Lemieux (2010) suggest to view the two strategies as complements, rather than 
substitutes.  
RDD strategies have been further developed in more complicated cases. RDD can be used to 
describe cases in which multiple variables assign individuals to a single treatment. In other 
cases, exogenously imposed cut-offs on several assignment variables define a set of different 
treatments, that is, the case of multiple assignment variables simultaneously (Papay et al., 
2011).  
In this study we consider RDD in a geographical setting, with forcing variable being the 
distance from a certain boundary between nations, regions, areas. Such boundaries form a 
discontinuity in space and they make a division between treated and control areas.  
Here follows some examples of Regression Discontinuity in literature, which inspired this 
research. 
Dell (2010) examines long-run effects of the mita, an extensive forced mining labour system 
in effect in Peru and Bolivia between 1573 an 1812. The contribution to the mita was not 
homogenous: on one side of the subjected region all communities had to send one seventh of 
their adult male population to work in the Potosí silver and Huancavelica mercury mines, 
while on the other side all communities were exempt. While historical documents reveal that 
distance to the mines and elevation were two criteria used to assigned the mita, in order to 
ensure that all other factors vary smoothly at the boundary, Dell focuses exclusively on the 
portion of the interested region that transects the Andean range in Southern Peru. 
Furthermore, given data availability she is able to limit the sample to districts within 50 km of 
the mita boundary. In the model, different specifications are used: a multi-dimensional 
specification involving a cubic polynomial in longitude and latitude; a single-dimensional 
model involving a cubic polynomial in distance to Potosí; a single-dimensional model 
involving a cubic polynomial in distance to mita boundary. Results show that a long-run mita 
effect lowers household consumption in 2001 by around 25%, with the coefficient being 
similar in all specifications and significant for one-dimensional RD estimates. Stunting in 
children increases by 6-7%. 
Bukowski (2015) studies the Partitions of Poland (1815-1918) among Austria, Prussia and 
Russia as a laboratory to investigate how history matters for student performance, by 
exploiting the fact that the borders were not drawn to reflect any pre-existing socio-economic, 
historical, geographic or ethnic division.  
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While the Austrian educational system, and similarly the Prussian one, was financed from 
local taxes, and had compulsory elementary and optional secondary education, the Russian 
educational system in turn practically did not exist in the 19th century (Snyder, 2006), as it 
had no compulsory elementary schooling, no coherent organization of a school network and 
no political will for expanding education (Bukowski, 2015). The author argue that differential 
legacy of Austria and Prussia originates from the different interaction between educational 
institutions and Polish identity, which is historically characterized by positive social norms 
towards educational systems.  
A geographical two-dimensional regression discontinuity design in latitude and longitude is 
implemented, using a linear, quadratic, cubic and quartile polynomials. A dummy variable 
takes value 1 for former Russian areas and 0 for either Austrian or Prussian areas.  
Results confirm the hypothesis that partitions have persisted through their impact on social 
norms toward local schools: test scores on the Austrian side of the former Austrian-Russian 
border are shown to be 0,6 standard deviation higher. 
Lee and Schultz (2012) study Cameroon, which includes regions colonized both by Britain 
and France, and exploit the artificial former colonial boundary as a discontinuity within a 
national demographic survey, the 2004 Demographic and Health Survey of Cameroon. Using 
both a local regression discontinuity design performed on bands of varying widths around the 
border and a comparison of neighbouring villages near the boundary, the authors are able to 
show that rural areas on the British side of discontinuity have higher levels of wealth and 
local public provision of piped water.  
Becker et al. (2016) provides evidence of persistence of institutions by investigating the 
experience of the Habsburg Empire. In particular, a fair, well-functioning and respected 
bureaucracy characterized the Habsburg Empire.  
The authors are able to prove that first, because of the historical experience of a relatively 
decentralized, honest and widely accepted state bureaucracy, Habsburg positively affected 
people’s trust in local public services. Second, this enduring effect on people’s values reduces 
corruption in interactions with the local administration, despite the fact that formal 
institutions, laws, and legal regulations do not differ anymore between former Habsburg and 
non-Habsburg areas.  
Microdata used is taken from Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) collected by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 29 countries; the analysis is restricted to 
countries that are either successor states of the Habsburg Empire or neighbouring countries 
thereof, for a total amount of 17 countries. The first specification of the model compares 
individuals living in communities located within 200 km of each other on either side of the 
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long-gone Habsburg border, using country-fixed effects to restrict the analysis to variation 
within modern day countries. Indeed, this identification exploits the fact that the Habsburg 
border cuts through five countries today (Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine). 
A large set of individual-level factors is controlled for.  
In the second specification geographical RDD is implemented, using both different 
specifications in polynomials in distance to border and two-dimensional specifications in 
latitude-longitude space. Different sizes of bandwidth are used too, from 25 to 200 km. 
Overall, the authors find that respondents in a current household survey who live on former 
Habsburg territory have higher levels of trust in courts and police. They are also less likely to 
pay bribes for these local public services, demonstrating that the institutional heritage 
influences not only preferences and unilateral decisions but also bilateral bargaining situations 
in citizen–state interactions.  
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2. Historical background 
 
 
In 19th Century, before unification in 1861, Italy was divided in: Kingdom of Sardinia, 
Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, Duchies of Parma and Piacenza, Duchy of Modena, Grand 
Duchy of Tuscany, Kingdom of Naples, Papal States, and territories subject to Austrian 
control. 
Such divisions were the consequence of the Congress of Vienna of 1815, when ambassadors 
from all over Europe met in order to determine the new political framework after Napoleonic 
France’s defeat and surrender. Congress’ resolutions were inspired by the principles of 
legitimacy and equilibrium, that is, the replacement on the throne of dynasties governing 
before French Revolution and Napoleonic wars in order to re-equilibrate the relations among 
nations and ensure continental safety. No room was left for national inspirations arisen during 
Napoleonic age, while the first aim of the Congress was the freezing of conflicts among 
European nations in the name of a “legitimate” order accepted by all States. 
In Italy, however, principle of legitimacy was not always respected, as Venice and Genova 
Republics were cancelled. Italy was subject to Austrian influence, either directly or indirectly. 
Austrian empire gained control of new-formed Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, comprising 
Lombardy and former Republic of Venice, while Habsburg Lorraine dynasty was restored to 
control of Tuscany and Modena. Duchies of Parma and Piacenza were given to Maria Luisa, 
Austrian emperor's daughter and Napoleon’s wife, while Bourbon dynasty, of Spanish 
origins, was restored to control of the Kingdom of Naples with Ferdinand I. Bourbon dynasty 
was an important instrument of the Austrian hegemony on the peninsula, as it was involved in 
defensive arrangements and a series of other alliances with Vienna. The only exception to 
Austrian influence was Kingdom of Sardinia, reined by Savoy dynasty. 
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2.1 Papal States  
 
 
The Papal States are territories of central Italy over which the Pope had sovereignty starting 
officially from 756 and lasting until 1870. The extent of papal control varied over the 
centuries and so did the geographical boundaries of the States. Modern regions of Lazio, 
Umbria, Marche and part of Emilia-Romagna were included under supremacy of the Pope.  
The Pope had complete and absolute power. His supremacy was however different from other 
absolute monarchies of 17th century, as it comprised both spiritual and temporal power, and it 
was elective rather than hereditary.  
In the 18th Century, Papal States were the most economically and politically backward 
territories in Italy, as land were in the hands of rich large owners in a structure of feudal kind. 
Where land was marshy, malaria was a social plague, while brigandage and beggary were 
other social issues.  
Napoleonic invasion deranged Italian political equilibrium, and the territories of Papal States 
experienced two periods of French domination, the Roman Republic (1798-1801) and the 
period of annexation to the French Empire (1805-1814). In 1814 after the Congress of Vienna 
Pope Pio VII came out of exile and went back to Rome, and a specific Commission was 
assigned the task to cancel all French administration acts and to restore the previous regime of 
administration. Napoleonic codes were abrogated, and expropriated church properties were 
returned. The following years were characterized by strong reactionary and conservative 
policies, while the population was growing revolutionary sentiment and organizing 
revolutionary movements (Zorzi et al., 2009).  
The brief experience of the Roman Republic in 1849 was crushed in 1850 by the French 
army. After unification of the Kingdom of Italy in 1961 Lazio remained under Papal control 
until annexation in 1870. 
The coexistence of spiritual and temporal power in what characterizes Papal States 
experience. Administrative structures in Papal States were very complex and often it is hard 
to distinguish between spiritual and worldly competences (Soresina, 2015).  
Generally speaking, Roman Curia is, still nowadays, the central administrative body of the 
Church, and is organized in different bodies, such as Secretariats, Congregations, Tribunals 
and Offices. In particular, in Papal States Congregations were administrative structures 
similar to ministers, and they were entirely composed by religious representatives who often 
had not the necessary qualification to comply with their tasks. The Pope had supreme 
authority and chose prefects and other administrative heads of Congregations, and many times 
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they were his relatives (Zorzi et al., 2009). The complexity of bureaucracy and the mixture of 
religious and political supremacy lead to an inefficient administration, characterized by 
privileges, corruption and limitation of freedom.  
Here is how French magistrate, philosopher and politician Charles de Brosses describes Rome 
in one of his letters to the family, written in Italy between 1739 and 1740:  
 
 
“The form of government is the worst one can imagine. Nicolò Machiavelli and Tommaso 
Moro conceived a utopia; here reality is the exact opposite. Imagine what may come from a 
population that is composed for one third by priests, one third by people who almost don’t 
work and for the last third, by people who don’t work at all; a state devoid of agriculture, 
commerce, industries, but that is located in the middle of fertile countryside and along a 
navigable river; a state whose sovereign, always old, whose government lasts shortly, often 
not able to act individually, is surrounded by siblings intent on their own interests as much as 
they can; and a state where after every changing new thieves come in place of those who are 
already satisfied; a state that ensure impunity to whoever might disrupt social order, as long 
as he is a powerful person’s friend, or he is on the border of a sacred asylum.”   
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2.2 Grand Duchy of Tuscany 
 
 
The Grand Duchy of Tuscany was ruled by the Medici, family of merchants and patrons of 
artists and scientists, from 16th Century until 1737. Merchant traditions, the enterprise of its 
economic actors, the vastness of its international relations and the cultural flurry made 
Tuscany the cradle of European Renaissance. From the beginning, Medici’s regime is built 
upon previous republican institutions without the exclusion of aristocracy, but instead 
integrating existing aristocracy with new formed bureaucratic class. The stability of 
Tuscany’s institutions, from Medici until the end of the Duchy, is funded on a compromise 
between aristocratic families and new emerging groups that are inserted in public professions 
(Carpanetto, Ricuperati, 1994). 
As regards religion, although Catholicism was the state religion, Medici supported tolerance 
towards other religions and in cities like Florence and Livorno non-Catholic communities 
were present, such as Jewish, Protestant, Muslim.  
When the last male Medici died the House of Habsburg Lorraine succeeded with Francis 
Stephen of Lorraine, husband of Maria Theresa. The Habsburg dynasty proved to be 
enlightened and reformer, and so did Leopold, son of Maria Theresa, who implemented 
leading economic, financial and judicial reforms. Furthermore, he proposed brave reforms 
inspired by jurisdictional principles in his ecclesiastical policy, such as the cancellation of the 
right of asylum and cancellation of religious orders of no public interest, limitation of 
ecclesiastical properties, state control of the formation of the clergy, suppression of the 
Inquisition. He even tried to impose Tuscan as language of religious public acts and condemn 
the cult of relics, but had to abandon its purposes because of the opposition of the population.  
The importance of a distinction between spiritual and secular power was a driver of Leopold’s 
policies. Here’s what Scipione de’ Ricci, Jansenist bishop and Leopold counsellor, writes to 
the Grand Duchy in 1786:  
 
“I t will be established as a principle that in all schools of the Grand Duchy catholic doctrine 
will be taught on the ground of distinction of the two powers, as Jesus Christ did not give to 
the Church pure spiritual power, and temporal power being given by God to sovereigns 
independently from it.” 
 
Leopold’s brave choices were however vanished by the conservative and reactionary policies 
of his successor, Ferdinand III. 
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In 1799 the French troops conquered Tuscany, and Napoleon constituted the Republic of 
Etruria (1799-1807). Since 1807 until the fall of Napoleon, Tuscany was part of the French 
Empire. 
After the Congress of Vienna, the Habsburg Lorraine dynasty was restored to control with 
Ferdinand III, brother of the Austrian emperor. Restored Tuscany was not characterized by 
persecutions and purges, and the House of Habsburg Lorraine maintained its reformer 
attitude. Ferdinand III abrogated Napoleonic codes, but was careful in perfecting previous 
codes by Leopold, and he further reformed commerce and fiscal system. Overall, pre-unity 
Tuscany is characterized by a relative institutional continuity. Moreover, in 1818 the 
government expresses the principle according to which the administration of charity entities 
and the protection of public health is a prerogative of the State. Grand Duchy of Tuscany is 
therefore the first state to consider the Church as a subsidiary in those areas (Almagisti, 
2016). 
As a centre for the European cultural development during the Renaissance, the Grand Duchy 
was able to maintain and develop its artistic and intellectual heritage in the following 
centuries. With respect to other states, less tight press and culture control characterized the 
Habsburg domain and literary and cultural clubs and academia proliferated. Tuscany was 
home of a wide class of intellectuals, artists and scientists, and the University of Pisa a centre 
of Italian Enlightenment.  
Tuscany appears peculiar with respect to other pre-unity states. I expect that not only the 
attitude of the sovereigns that succeeded on the throne towards ecclesiastical policies, but also 
the vivid cultural environment in which Renaissance and Enlightenment could find full 
expression have made Tuscan population observant of the principle of secularity of the state. 
We don’t expect to find either positive or significant differences in this sense with Papal 
States municipalities in our regressions. 
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2.3 Kingdom of the Two Sicilies 
 
 
The Kingdom of Naples comprehended the southern portion of Italy since Middle Ages until 
1860.  It was often united politically with Sicily.  
In XVI century the Spanish conquered Sicily and Naples, which were held by viceroys for 
two centuries. As a result of Spanish Succession the Kingdom of Naples came under the 
influence of the Austrian Habsburgs, but in 1734 Spanish gained again control of Sicily and 
Naples, and were governed by the Bourbons as a separate kingdom. During Napoleonic era, 
southern part of Italy had a brief republican experience with the Parthenopean Republic 
(1799-1801) and became Kingdom of Naples under French control since 1806. In the 
meanwhile Sicily was still under control of the Bourbons. After the Congress of Vienna, in 
1816 Naples and Sicily were formally united in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in control of 
the Bourbons. 
As in other pre-unity States, the main economic activity in the Kingdom was agriculture. 
However a middle bourgeois class developed only in XVIII century after the elimination of 
feudalism. Before the republican experience in 1799, almost 70% of the population lived in 
feudal territories and was subject to a feudal jurisdiction (Meriggi, 2002). Local large 
landowners were in complete control of the territories, and the ancient aristocracy had all kind 
of privileges. The large majority of the population was composed by a mass of peasants tied 
to the land by servile constraints that originated in the Middle Ages (Botta, 2010). The 
dismantling of feudalism started under French domination with Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon’s 
brother. Also because of the absence of industries and weak commerce, the Kingdom of 
Naples was characterized by economic and cultural backwardness, although Naples has been 
an important centre of European Enlightenment. When Ferdinand IV of Bourbon was back on 
the throne, the return to the previous regime was less traumatic than in other parts of Italy, as 
he decided to keep many of Joseph Bonaparte and Murat’s reforms. His enlightened 
absolutism tried to address some of the issues of the kingdom. 
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2.4 Education in Italy before unification  
 
 
In 18th Century Italy, primary and lower secondary education is a direct consequence of 
private precepts (Dal Passo, 2003), rather than a real public institution. From the second half 
of 18th Century, however, a greater attention towards the organization of public education 
emerges, thanks to reform projects of the Enlightenment. The Enlightened idea of an 
educational system open to the whole population, as part of the project of a lay and 
autonomous State started developing among enlightened sovereigns like Maria Theresa in 
Lombardy. But poor life conditions of the populations, lack of teachers, scarce state 
interventions and the almost complete absence of didactic caused the ineffectiveness of all 
reformative attempts. 
Restoration involved the return of education in clerical hands, as all responsibility of 
educating the population was left to religious orders, Jesuits mostly, and ecclesiastical 
authorities chose teachers. The aim of this reorganization was to cancel all trace of 
Napoleonic influences and enlightened culture, which were considered as dangerous means of 
diffusion of ideas that could destabilize political and moral order. 
Catholic tradition considered education as subordinated to confessional practices and 
catechism was at the centre of educational system. Throughout Italian peninsula, proper 
schools existed in bigger towns only, and were almost absent in rural centres.  
In Papal States there was no state financed educational system. The first real institutional 
reform of the educational system occurred in 1824, when Pope Leo XII created Congregatio 
Studiorum. What characterizes education in the Papal States is that religious authorities 
supplied education in its entirety. Universities, seminaries and municipal schools composed 
the educational system in Papal States. Free parish schools had a certain importance, while 
private for money schools were addressed to prepare kids for humanitarian studies (Raffaele, 
2004). 
Most of the teachers were priests, chosen by a commission headed by the local bishop. 
Female teachers had to be necessarily unmarried, and had to demonstrate morality and upright 
ways.  Lay teachers were only a tiny minority. Secondary education, composed by colleges 
and gymnasia, was generally reserved to those willing to start a clergyman carrier, and 
however reserved to males.  
The most important Universities were in Rome and Bologna, and six other universities were 
present on the kingdom. Religious representatives were also at the top of universities’ 
structures. 
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Notwithstanding the attempt to enlarge the educated portion of the population, illiteracy rates 
were very high: Bowring (1838) states that 1 over 50 children attended school in 1838. Until 
unification, the inefficiencies of educational institutions added up over the years.  
Felice (2007) shows that in 1861 literacy rate was 28.1% in Emilia-Romagna, 21% in 
Marche, 19.9% in Umbria, 32.3% in Lazio. 
Also in Tuscany religious orders control popular educational system, while wealthy families 
could afford for private teachers. During its reign, Leopold put effort in trying to deliver 
education from religious control, but notwithstanding the dissolution of the Company of Jesus 
(1773), few progresses were made.  
Leopold’s reform of the educational system, Regolamento generale di tutte le scuole del 
Granducato (1778), which planned the organization of three levels of education and provided 
rules for recruitment of teachers, did not find application. 
During Restoration, in the Kingdom of the two Sicilies the Bourbons affirmed a centralistic 
and bureaucratic policy, progressive and linear (Raffaele, 2004). The aim of new reforms was 
to constitute a new system made by the relationship between institutions and local power, 
through the introduction of a peripheral public apparatus that had to be widespread distributed 
throughout the territories of the Kingdom. Reforms tried to address the needs of the 
population, including education, as State was trying to be the promoter of civil progress.  
Ferdinand Restoration was however founded on the principle of compliance with the 
Church’s precepts and opinion, as religion was still considered a guarantor of public and 
private morality. This promotion of Christian doctrine reflected also in education, while 
Jesuits came back to Sicily in 1804 and monopolized lower secondary education. Other 
religious orders had important educational centres.  
Projects of reforms of secondary education were reserved to scholars and wealthier segments 
of the population. In 1820-1821 social rebellions stopped all reformation plans, pushing the 
government to implement a reactionary and conservatory attitude.  
In the following decades little advancements were made in terms of education reforms, and at 
the time of unification illiteracy rates in southern Italy were the highest in the new-born 
Kingdom (Felice, 2007). 
The Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia under the Habsburgs was characterized by the most 
advanced public education system. The system, financed by the States and the municipalities, 
was organized in primary minor schools, distributed in every parish centre, and major schools 
in bigger towns. Education was open to both males and females, and education was 
mandatory from six until twelve years old. Teachers were instructed in normal schools, 
technical schools prepared for a career in commerce and industry.  
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Universities of Padova and Pavia were advanced centres of high-level education. 
However, educational systems in all pre-unity states had common criticalities, such as scarcity 
of infrastructure and teachers, seasonal school leaving to work in the fields, low teacher 
salary. All these problems of course reflected in the quality of teaching.  
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2.5 Italy in 1861: economic indicators and disparities 
 
 
Italy was among the first countries in the world to publish its own historical series of national 
accounts in 1957, when ISTAT, Italian National Statistics Institute, published a complete 
system of national accounts with yearly time series starting from 1861 and ending in 1955.  
It is now widely recognized that ISTAT’s pioneering work had serious inconsistencies that 
were not fully remedied by subsequent revisions (Felice, 2015). It was only on occasion for 
the 150th anniversary of Italy’s unification in 2011 that a project coordinated by the Bank of 
Italy in cooperation with Istat and Tor Vergata University of Rome published a reconstruction 
of the national accounts for the whole century and a half since unification (Baffigi, 2011). 
Furthermore, a growing body of literature (Felice, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2015; Cappelli, 2015) 
has now estimated the main features of Italy’s modern economic growth from unification to 
present day, discussing many variables beyond GDP estimates, such as living standards, 
social capital and inequality of personal income distribution. Also, notwithstanding the 
difficulty to ascertain product levels at the regional level, these authors were able to discuss 
regional inequalities and paths of development at the regional level. 
The Kingdom of Italy was officially born on 17 March 1861. The unification process had 
started just two years before and formally ended with the annexation of Rome in 1870. 
Around 1860, the Italian economy was made up of various local economic systems that 
followed the political map of pre-unification Italy but with some additional fragmentation, 
such as disparities within the former southern kingdom, the Papal States or the kingdom of 
Savoy (Felice, 2010). Italy at the time was still predominantly agricultural, with urban life and 
manufacturing and tertiary poles mostly located on the western coast, from Turin and Genoa 
southward to Naples and Palermo (Felice, 2010). 
From the time of unification, Italian GDP per capita has increased about thirteen fold (Felice, 
2015). The overall result is remarkable but appears to be in line with what is found in other 
countries, and the features of Italy’s growth over the hundred-year period are qualitatively 
similar to those of other advanced countries (Maddison, 2001). Italy was a country rich in 
labour, with the fifth largest population in Europe after France, Germany, Austria-Hungary 
and the United kingdom, but poor income-wise, and even poorer with regard to human and 
physical capital, especially in the South (Felice, 2015).  
Vecchi (2011) offers an extraordinary reconstruction of life conditions of Italians from 1861 
to 2001, and let us know that the poverty of the new-born Italian Kingdom was of many 
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forms. In 1861 life expectancy at birth was 29-30 years, illiteracy rate was almost 80%, and 
43.9% of total population was in absolute poverty. 
As regards regional inequalities, different theoretical approaches share the belief that over the 
long run regional inequality is somehow self-correcting, although for various reasons the pace 
of convergence may proceed at a slower rate than expected (Felice, 2011), but Italy seems not 
to adhere to such framework, and the lack of convergence has been widely recognized.  
The problem of the south (questione meridionale) has been debated with at leas three different 
views (Felice, 2011). The first view, prevailing up to the 1990s, holds that at the time of 
Unification the north-central regions, due to a better geographical position, more favourable 
natural endowments, and higher human and social capital, were already more advanced, and 
thus a natural fit for industrialization. A second and opposite view holds that the south was 
exploited by the north. A third and more recent view argues that although the south as a whole 
may have ranked somewhat lower than the centre-north in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, it is misleading to consider southern Italy as a uniformly backward area, and 
considers it conversely as a highly diversified region. Furthermore, at least three other 
arguments have attracted the attention of scholars towards the Italian case: the role of 
international openness and in particular of emigration, the failure of state intervention and the 
role of social capital. In fact, Italy has been identified as a country that is largely characterized 
by regional differences in social factors, social capital and culture, in the sense of values and 
attitudes, and these ‘social factors’ have been increasingly regarded as major determinants of 
differences in economic outcomes (Felice, 2011).  
Felice (2001) provides estimates of value added per capita at the regional level for benchmark 
years between 1891 and 1951. Results show that the north–south divide was not particularly 
prominent in 1891 or even in 1911. In the first half of the twentieth century, however, 
differences increased. The northwest pulled ahead first, while the central and north-eastern 
regions successfully caught up between 1938 and the present day, and by 2001 they were not 
far behind the northwest. The Mezzogiorno mostly fell behind in 1911–51, especially during 
the interwar years, and although it began to converge during Italy’s economic boom (1951–
71), it fell back again, although to a lesser extent, from the 1970s on.  
The figures also suggest that, in order to analyse the pattern of regional inequality, Italy is 
better divided into three rather than two macroeconomic areas. Within both the centre/north-
east and the Mezzogiorno, regional differences were very high in 1891 and 1911. The three-
part classification took shape in the interwar years when, in contrast to an increasing 
divergence at the national level, a process of convergence within the three macro-areas took 
place.  
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Overall, according to Felice (2001), out of the three hypotheses outlined before about the 
problems of the south, the most recent one, which regards southern Italy as being highly 
diversified, seems to be more in line with present estimates. Disparities were remarkable 
within southern Italy, but on average this area as a whole was not far below the rest of the 
country (Felice, 2011).  
At the odds with this result there is relevant evidence of a remarkable north-south divide in 
terms of social indicators, as anticipated before. Felice (2007) discusses regional disparities in 
terms of social indicators as height, education, life expectancy and human development index. 
At the time of Unification regional discrepancies in levels of education were higher than those 
for income or life expectancy. In 1871, literacy rate in the south was 16%, against 30% in 
north-east and 55% in north-west. The convergence of the south proceeds at high speed until 
the 1970s, but slows down in the last two decades, and little differences persist even in 2001. 
Further evidence comes from the elaboration of regional Human Development Index and 
Improved Human Development Index, two composite indexes which incorporate three 
different dimensions of welfare: resources, longevity and knowledge or education. Both the 
two indices confirm the conclusion about a rapid convergence of the south until the 1970s and 
the subsequent slowing down of the process, which was overall insufficient to fill the gaps, 
visible even in 2001. 
The historical picture seems to support this explanation for the persistent backwardness of the 
south, that is, a lower social capital, and the somehow correlated institutional failure and 
pervasiveness of organized crime (Felice, 2011). Southern regions characterized by relatively 
low levels of organized crime (Abruzzi, Lucania, and Sardinia) are in fact the only ones to 
have (slowly) converged in recent decades.  
Furthermore, the evidence presented in Felice (2011), pointing to the fact that the recent 
divergence in the south is due to decreasing activity rates (labour force as a share of total 
population), gives more strength to the social capital explanation, for two reasons. Firstly, a 
backward society relying on familism, as southern Italy supposedly is, tends to maintain 
lower employment rates, in primis of female workers. This is even truer if it is no longer an 
agricultural economy, where rural housewives may be counted in the labour force. Secondly, 
workers in illegal activities, which expanded in the south during recent decades due to the rise 
of criminal organizations, as well as a widespread moral and social attitude of resistance to 
state control, often go unconsidered in the official accounts, resulting in inaccurately lower 
activity rates (Felice, 2011).  
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3. The persistence of Italian pre-unity institutions 
 
 
Italy displays a mosaic of different regional paths of economic development, and the 
persistence of its regional inequalities has made Italy the European country where research on 
regional development is most abundant (Felice 2010).  
As previously seen, the determinants and characteristics of such inequalities have been 
discussed my many authors, and recent debate addresses the issue of regional disparities 
starting from the time of unification, in years following 1861. Indeed, among the factors that 
might help to explain regional differences, one of the most peculiar is certainly Italy’s legacy 
of pre-unification states (Cappelli 2015).  
Institutions of Papal States, Grand Duchy of Tuscany and Kingdom of the two Sicilies have 
been rather stable over time, and they have very different characteristics. A government 
characterized by an absolute power that mixes spiritual and temporal power reigned in Papal 
States, while Tuscany had the experience of a government that is oriented towards state 
intervention and the overcoming of oligarchic control and involvement in the public 
confrontation of different social classes (Almagisti, 2016).  
The aim of this study is to understand if these institutions in force before unity have had long 
lasting effects, in a similar way to Becker et al. (2016) for Habsburg Empire. The regional 
heterogeneity in modern Italy complicates the identification of such effects, and in order to 
overcome the problem, Regression Discontinuity Design seems the best methodology to use. 
RDD is implemented around former historic borders of pre-unity states. 
The experience of Papal States in the centre of Italy is peculiar with respect to the other parts 
of the Country and deserves particular attention. I am willing to understand whether a secular 
experience of a despotic clerical government in the Papal State area has changed the attitude 
towards religion. This may have happened if the oppression, inefficiency and corruption that 
characterized the Papal State have generated an opposition in population that went beyond 
politics. Not only it has lead people to develop hostility towards such institutions, but also to 
grow particular attention and interest towards the secularity of the state and respect of 
individual freedom, against the imposition of religious principles on the lay society. 
In the first part of the work we are considering variables concerning ethics and demand for 
secularism of the state. We consider variables which express personal preferences towards 
choices that involve the religious sphere and ideas of personal freedom: we look at the results 
of 1974 referendum about divorce, to test whether municipalities that were part of the Papal 
State have a different probability of being favourable to divorce.  
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We further look at the probability of choosing a religious marriage with respect to a civil one. 
We propose two other outcomes that might help explaining the higher demand for secularity 
of the state in former Papal States municipalities.  
First, we consider variables related to social capital and cooperation. Social capital is also 
identified as one of the major source of discrepancy among Italian regions (Felice 2007, 
2010). Putnam’s hypothesis (1993) arguing that the different endowments of social capital in 
Italian territories can be traced back to different Middle Ages experiences needs to be 
integrated, as medieval comuni are not the only relevant historic institutional reality 
(Almagisti, 2016).  
Participation rates to 1974, 2011 referendum, presence of no profit organizations and number 
of volunteers in such organizations are the variables that we consider in order to investigate 
whether the experience of the Papal state has lead people to develop greater social 
participation and engagement, or other relevant differences in terms of endowments of 
political participation and civic engagement. 
The second proposed outcome is education. Indeed, education interacts with social capital, 
and is usually a predictor of political and social engagement (Heliwell and Putnam, 1999).  
Similarly to education, scholars trace back to the time of unification important discrepancies 
among Italian regions in terms of education and human capital (Felice 2007). Even though a 
path of convergence among different parts of Italy has certainly developed over decades, 
some differences are still visible.  
Our research question is rather whether a higher attention for secularization of the state and a 
higher social capital in former Papal States territories come together with a higher demand for 
education once better institutions are established in unified Italy. 
For these reasons we investigate whether an impact of pre-unification institutions is still 
present at the municipality level in terms of all levels of education: illiteracy rates, primary-
lower secondary school qualification, upper secondary qualification, university degree. 
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3.1 Data and empirical strategy 
 
 
The analysis draws on municipality-level data published by ISTAT in 2011 “Misure dei 
Comuni” and “Atlante dei Comuni” registers, which are two collections of many surveys 
collected by ISTAT over the years. In particular, data about marriages refer to 2012, data 
about TV subscriptions refer to 2009, while data about literacy and education refer to 2001.   
In order to perform our analysis on 1974 referendum, we created the first digital archive of 
results of that referendum at the municipal level. Results were digitalized from official paper 
registers provided by Italian Ministry of Interior. 
The distance of each municipality from former historic borders are measured using QGIS, a 
geographic information system open source software. The ancient borders were drawn on the 
map of modern Italy using the software thanks to data about historical affiliations of each 
municipality. 
We are comparing the following borders in year 1848: 
- north border of Papal States, comprehensive of Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia and 
Duchies of Parma and Modena  
- Papal States and Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; 
- Papal States and Grand Duchy of Tuscany. 
 
 
The borders have been chosen because they have been rather stable over centuries, and so 
have been the kingdoms within them and their institutions, while in the north many different 
dominations and political influences have been succeeding over time in a less stable way. For 
this reason, the interpretation of differences among municipalities in the northern regions of 
Italy could be more complicated and misleading. 
We follow Dell (2010), Becker et al. (2016), Bukowski (2015), Lee and Schultz (2012) and 
employ a regression discontinuity design that evaluates the effect of Italian pre-unity 
institutions on a discontinuous jump at the borders.  
We focus on local linear regression, and for each regression the optimal bandwidth around the 
border is computed using the strategy developed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012), in 
particular using a uniform kernel distribution. Bandwidth is computed using the command 
developed for Stata by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). 
With respect to Dell (2010) and Bukowski (2015), who employ a two-dimensional 
geographical RDD using a polynomial of latitude and longitude, similarly to Lee and Schultz 
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(2012) we will employ a one-dimensional strategy that controls in distance from the border. 
An interaction of distance and dummy variable is also included as control.  
Like in Becker (2012), this study involves the historic settling of a long-gone political border.  
The long temporal distance between modern days and pre-unity situations was a period of 
strong economic growth and progress, extraordinary historic events such as two World Wars, 
heterogeneous economic policies and programs, economic peculiarities of different territories, 
and it is hard to imagine that we are able to correctly identify in our models the effect of 
institutions which ceased to exist more than 150 years ago after all Italy has been through 
after unification. As anticipated before, a within-region or even within-province study would 
enable us to test even more convincingly the importance of pre-unity borders in explaining 
differences among Italian regions, but pre-unity borders follows almost exactly modern 
regions’ borders.  
However, in order to ensure a greater robustness of our results, in the only two cases where 
historic border crosses modern regions, Latium and Emilia Romagna, within region studies 
are implemented as further robustness checks.  
In the following pages I present the borders that we consider through three maps obtained 
using QGIS, showing an example of buffer around each of them. The sample buffer is 40 km 
wide. 
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Figure 1: 40 km buffer around former Papal States - Kingdom of Lombardy - Venetia and   Duchies of 
Parma and Modena border 
    
Figure 2: 40 km buffer around former Papal States and Kingdom of the two Sicilies 
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 Figure 3: 40 km buffer around former Papal States - Grand Duchy of Tuscany border   
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The model can be written as: 
 
𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽2𝐷 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑆 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝛽4Χ + 𝜇 
  
where D indicates distance from the border, and PS a dummy for municipality on the Papal 
States side of the border. Our coefficient of interest is 𝛽3, indicating the marginal effect of 
historic affiliation to Papal States. Y is our outcome of interest at the municipality level. 
X is a vector of municipality level controls. Baseline specification includes the following 
controls: 
Population - population census;  
Area - municipality land area, expressed in kmq;  
Mountainous area - indicates the ratio between mountainous area and total area; 
Height - indicates the height above sea level of the municipality, expressed from the centre; 
Seismicity - municipalities are classified in four categories expressing their seismic risk; 
categories are determined according to PGA, Peak Ground Acceleration, and frequency and 
intensity of seismic events. It is five-category scale going from 1 (high seismic risk) to 5 (very 
low seismic risk).  
Seismicity is used as a control as it could increase religiosity. The religious coping theory 
refers to the activity of drawing on religious beliefs to understand and deal with adverse life 
events. In particular, Bentzen (2015) combines subnational district level data on values across 
the globe from the World Values Survey with spatial data on natural disasters and finds that 
individuals are more religious when their district was hit by recently by an earthquake. 
Moreover, individuals are more religious when living in areas with higher long-term 
earthquake risk.  
Dimension - it is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the population is greater than 
15000, 0 otherwise; 
Urban - three-category scale indicating level of urbanization; 
Houses pre-1900 - indicates the ratio of houses built before 1900 on total number of houses; 
Class ages – we control for the proportion of the population ranging from 15 to 54 years old. 
 
To conclude, to control for region dummies seems not appropriate in this model.  
The first reason, regarding 1974 referendum, is that modern Italian regions with ordinary 
autonomy started to be concretely established only in 1968 with law number 108 of February 
17th, even though regions had been defined in 1948 in the Constitution. Therefore, it is hard 
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to imagine an effect of regional institutions on the 1974 referendum results, only six years 
after their establishment.  
As regards modern outcomes, such as education in 2001 or participation to referendum vote 
in 2011, simple region dummies may capture variability driven not only by local institutions, 
but other local characteristics. As modern region borders correspond in most cases to historic 
borders, collinearity may cause these dummies to capture even the effect of former affiliation 
to Papal States. We therefore chose to insert in the baseline model other variables in order to 
control for the effect of local institutions, for outcomes in years 2001-2011-2012 (that is, all 
outcomes except for results of 1974 referendum). We use faith in local (regional) institutions 
in 2014, expressed as the average score on a 0 to 10 scale expressed by people aged more than 
14, and the ratio of local education expenses on Italian GDP in 2011, both provided by 
ISTAT1, as measures of the goodness and perception of local institutions.  
In the next pages I present a summary of descriptive statistics of control variables for a 40km 
sample around each border. 
                                                        
1 ISTAT, “100 statistiche per capire il Paese in cui viviamo”, 2015 edition. 
  ISTAT, “Rapporto BES 2015” (benessere equo e sostenibile). 
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Table 1: descriptive statistics of 40 km around north Papal States border sample    
       
Table 2: descriptive statistics of 40 km around south Papal States border sample  
 Papal States    North (Duchies and Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia) 
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Population 10283.41 27194.13 328 261362 15106.57 42155.17 819 371337 
Mountainous 0.124 0.329 0 1 0.259 0.433 0 1 
Dimension 0.122 0.328 0 1 0.187 0.392 0 1 
Height 106.562 222.101 0 1131 120.635 215.656 0 841 
Seismicity 3.447 0.651 2 4 2.948 0.394 2 4 
Urban 1.822 0.503 1 3 1.625 0.567 1 3 
House spre1900 592.493 2148.85 3 32457 890.114 2997.231 6 27674 
Age 15-54 0.501 0.407 0.412 0.616 0.517 0.414 0.398 0.634 
Educational expenses 2.672 0.133 2.5 3.2 2.612 0.033 2.6 2.7 
Faith in institutions 3.93 0.183 3.8 4.3 4.15 0.133 3.8 4.2 
 Papal States    Kingdom of the two Sicilies   
  Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Population 4296.312 7856.163 95 68503 14808.89 147716.5 126 2546804 
Mountainous 0.773 0.379 0 1 0.659 0.445 0 1 
Dimension 0.052 0.222 0 1 0.104 0.306 0 1 
Height 560.818 328.385 2 1433 449.748 226.794 4 1070 
Seismicity 1.727 0.574 1 3 2.023 0.437 1 3 
Urban 1.303 0.479 1 3 1.466 0.575 1 3 
Houses pre1900 411.398 537.007 0 5574 648.302 378.072 0 65143 
Age 15-54 0.523 0.521 0.222 0.603 0.517 0.524 0.318 0.607 
Educational expenses 4.154 0.771 3.3 6.9 3.473 0.279 3.3 4.1 
Faith in institutions 3.469 0.104 3.3 3.6 3.580 0.0393 3.5 3.6 
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Table 3: descriptive statistics of 40 km around Tuscany  - Papal States border sample 
  
 
 Papal States    Grand Duchy of Tuscany   
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Population 13783.24 33571.21 576 358079 11982.7 31061.52 313 371337 
Mountainous 46.714 58.404 0 372.04 38.389 62.185 0 525.08 
Dimension 0.190 0.394 0 1 0.171 0.377 0 1 
Height 298.690 229.129 3 1388 284.259 202.421 2 915 
Seismicity 2.417 0.552 2 4 2.346 0.502 2 4 
Urban 1.476 0.599 1 3 1.446 0.593 1 3 
Houses pre1900 1433.81 3504.994 204 42464 699.406 1918.124 2 27674 
Age 15-54 0.488 0.365 0.341 0.571 0.496 0.294 0.409 0.569 
Educational expenses 3.175 0.120 2.6 3.2 3.233 0.619 2.6 4.1 
Faith in institutions 4.295 0.020 4.2 4.3 3.849 0.317 3.5 4.2 
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3.2 Ethics 
 
 
In the first part of the study we try to understand whether the experience of Papal States, 
where political power accompanied spiritual leadership, has lead people to change their 
attitude towards ethical matters and religion.  
In order to do that we consider first the results of 1974 referendum on divorce and see 
whether municipalities that used to be affiliated to the Papal States are more likely to be in 
favour of divorce. Secondly, we consider the proportion of religious marriages over total 
marriages in year 2012. 
 
 
3.2.1 Divorce referendum, 1974 
 
 
The referendum on divorce law was held on May 12, 1974. Voters were asked whether they 
wanted to repeal the Fortuna-Baslini law of 1970, which allowed divorce for the first time in 
Italian history (abrogative referendum). Therefore, an answer “Yes” indicated the will to 
outlaw divorce, while an answer “No” indicated the will to keep it in force. Christian groups 
collected initial petitions, with strong support from the Catholic Church.  
The vote fired up public opinion and political discussion: Christian groups asserted the 
sacredness of marriage tie, ratified by the priest in front of God, while the counterparts 
affirmed the importance of freedom of choice. Democrazia Cristiana, Movimento Sociale 
Italiano, Südtiroler Volkspartei and Partito democratico italiano di Unità monarchica 
supported “Yes”. Socialists, communists, republicans, liberals and radicals supported “No”. 
Catholic Church considered divorce as a serious offense to the sacred promise of two spouses 
who decided to join their lives in front of God. Marriage was considered indissoluble. Divorce 
was also thought to be dangerous because of the disorder it creates within the family, 
especially for children. The spreading of divorce was considered as a true social plague. 
The referendum was defeated by 59.26% against 40.74%, allowing divorce to remain in force.  
Our outcome of interest is the ratio between votes favourable to divorce (answer “No”) and 
the sum to total votes, favourable and unfavourable. A high ratio means that a high percentage 
of voters wanted divorce to stay in force. A greater likelihood of being favourable to divorce 
indicates that people living in a certain municipality do not recognize themselves in the ideas 
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about marriages expressed by the Church, but rather are against the imposition of Catholic 
doctrine on the whole Italian society and have a more worldly conception of marriage.  
Table 4 shows results for the effect of Papal States affiliation on the proportion of favourable 
votes to divorce. Columns (1), (2), (3) show results for each considered boundary: Kingdom 
of Lombardy-Venetia, Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and Grand Duchy of Tuscany. 
Municipality level controls are included in each regression. 
I remark that in this regression regional characteristics, faith in local institutions and regional 
educational expenses on Italian GDP, are not included. First, it would not make sense because 
we are considering an outcome dated back in 1974, while data about regional institutions date 
2011 and 2014. Secondly, regional institutions started to be materially implemented only in 
1968, and considering the time that takes to completely organize and settle the bureaucratic 
and organizational system of regions it seems reasonable to assume that there is no significant 
effect of these institutions from 1968 till 1974.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on proportion of votes favourable to divorce 
over total votes, referendum 1974 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Referendum 1974 North South Tuscany 
        
Papal States 0.1554*** 0.0127 -0.0602*** 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.018) 
Distance 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance -0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Observations 579 815 349 
R-squared 0.520 0.253 0.204 
controls YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Results show how municipalities that used to be part of Papal States have a greater proportion 
of votes favourable to divorce. The coefficient for Papal States on the northern boundary is 
highly significant, at 1% level, and indicates that being a municipality within former Papal 
States boundaries increases the proportion of favourable votes to divorce of 0.15 percentage 
points. This result is coherent if we consider the preponderant role of Catholic Church in 
north-eastern regions, Veneto especially. Indeed, a strong religious mark characterized 
Venetian patriciate since the early days of the Republic (Cracco, 2009). Venetian bishops 
exercised both spiritual and civil control on the population, especially in rural areas, and their 
authority was the result of the interpenetration between episcopal office and belonging to 
Venetian aristocracy. Moreover, after Restoration and the dissolution of Serenissima 
Republic, people started to develop a sense of extraneousness towards institutions, and started 
conceiving the Church as the only institutional body that was able to protect and regulate 
society (Almagisti, 2016). 
The coefficient against Kingdom of the Two Sicilies is positive but not significant. 
Tuscany instead shows to be even more favourable to divorce with respect to Papal States. 
This result however is not surprising given cultural and political tradition of Tuscany, and 
instead shows that perhaps political heritage from pre-unity period has transmitted over 
centuries.   
The coefficient for distance from the border is significant in all the three models, but indicates 
no sizeable effect of distance on our outcome of interest, while the interaction of distance and 
the dummy for Papal States is not significant in the model for Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 
Overall results support our hypothesis of a reaction to centuries of political supremacy of the 
Church in former territories of the Papal States. Municipalities that experienced centuries of 
Papal supremacy seem to refuse the imposition of a Catholic ideology on society.   
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3.2.2 Religious marriages 
 
 
The second considered outcome is the proportion of religious marriages over total marriages 
in year 2012. This variable indicates the preference towards a religious ceremony to sanction 
the birth of a new family. Even though the choice of a religious marriage does not necessary 
correspond to a full internalisation of the principles expressed in a religious marriage, the 
choice of a civil marriage indicates the preference toward a civil recognition of a personal 
union, that is recognition in front of the state, in terms of laws, rights and duties.  
Table 5 shows the effect of historic Papal States affiliation on the proportion of religious 
marriages in 2012. Columns (1), (2), (3) show results for each considered boundary: Kingdom 
of Lombardy-Venetia, Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and Grand Duchy of Tuscany. 
Municipality level controls are included in each regression, including controls for regional 
institutions. 
 
 
 
Table 5: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on proportion of religious marriages over total 
marriages, year 2012 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Religious Marriages North South Tuscany 
        
Papal States -0.1163*** -0.0702 0.0433 
 
(0.035) (0.044) (0.065) 
Distance -0.0000 0.0000* -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Observations 483 831 340 
R-squared 0.187 0.092 0.057 
controls YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses built 
before 1900, class age controls, faith in local institutions, ratio of regional educational expenses on Italian GDP. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  45 
The coefficient for Papal States considering the boundary with northern regions is negative, 
indicating that historic Papal States affiliation decreases the proportion of religious marriages 
over total marriages by 0.11 percentage points. The effect is not sizeable but highly 
significant, at 1% level. 
The coefficient for Papal States versus Kingdom of the Two Sicilies is negative but not 
significantly different for zero. Like for 1974 referendum, Tuscany is the exception with 
respect to the other states. The coefficient indicates a higher proportion of religious marriages 
in Papal States with respect to Tuscany. However, this result is not statistically significant. 
Both our results on divorce and religious marriages prove empirical evidence to our 
hypothesis of a reaction to years of imposition of Catholic ideology in the government of the 
State. 
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3.3 Social capital and cooperation 
 
 
Social capital is studied in modern literature as one of the determinants of the good 
functioning of institutions; it can lead to higher levels of civic success and economic 
development. The policy-making community has embraced the creation of social capital as a 
solution for social problems as diverse as promoting economic development in Africa and 
stemming urban decay in Los Angeles (Boix and Posner, 1996). 
Social capital is discussed in two different ways in contemporary academic literature (World 
Bank, 2004).  
The first, primarily associated with sociologists Burt, Lin and Portes, refers to the resources, 
such as information, ideas, support that individuals are able to produce by virtue of their 
relationships with other people. The second and more common approach is associated with 
political scientist Robert Putnam and refers to “features of social life (networks, norms and 
trust) that enable participants to act together more efficiently to pursue shared objectives” 
(Putnam, 1995). Similarly, the OECD defines social capital as “networks together with shared 
norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” 
(Keeley, 2007). Chatting with neighbours, engaging in recreational activities, joining 
associations and organizations or political parties are all forms of social capital that 
characterize the ways in which the members of a community interact. Social capital can be 
considered as a measure of cooperation among people that are part of a community. 
Social capital is related to political participation, but the terms are not synonymous.  
Political participation refers to relations with political institutions, while social capital refers 
to relations with one another. Putnam (1995) uses the term “civic engagement” to refer to 
people’s connections with the life of their communities, that is the networks, norms of 
reciprocity and trust that are fostered among the members of a community.  
Civic engagement is correlated with political participation, but causality between the two is an 
empirical question and not a logical certitude. Rather, empowerment and political action can 
be considered as part of social capital. Indeed social links can be distinguished in: “bonds”, 
links to people based on a sense of common identity, such as family, close friends, 
neighbours; “bridges”, that stretch beyond a sense of identity, such as distant friends, 
colleagues and associates; “links” to people or groups further up and down the social ladder, 
ties to people in a position of authority, such as representatives of public and private 
institutions (Keeley, 2007 and Grootaert et al., 2004).  
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Narayan (2002) defines empowerment as the expansion of assets and capabilities of people to 
participate in, negotiate with, influence, control and hold accountable institutions that affect 
their lives. Empowerment refers to the expansion of freedom of choice and action to shape 
one’s life, and it implies control over resources and decisions. 
Several authors have addressed the issue of differences in terms of social indicators among 
different parts of Italy. Culture, values and attitudes differ a lot across Italian regions and they 
have been increasingly regarded as determinants of differences in economic outcomes.  
In his famous work “Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy”, Putnam 
(1993) evaluates the institutional performance of twenty Italian regional governments using 
surveys, interviews and a diverse set of policy indicators. His central finding is that wide 
variations in the performance of these governments are closely related to the vibrancy of 
associational life in each region. In northern Italy, where citizens participate actively in sports 
clubs, literary guilds, service groups and choral societies, regional governments are efficient 
in their internal operation, creative in their policy initiatives and effective in implementing 
those initiatives (Putnam, 1993). In southern Italy, by contrast, where patterns of civic 
engagement are far weaker, regional governments tend to be corrupt and inefficient.  
The reason for these differences among different parts of Italy is, according to Putnam, 
historical, and his analysis starts from 11th and 12th centuries. As Europe emerged from 
feudalism, the bonds of personal dependence lord-vassal got weaker in Northern regions, 
which were characterized by flourishing commercial cities, but got stronger in the South, 
where in Papal States and Norman territories population remained subjects rather than 
learning to be citizens. 
In the North, where there was more equality, cooperation was easier to sustain, while 
inequalities that characterized social life in the South fuelled resentments that prevented 
cooperative practices from crystallizing (Boix and Posner, 1996). Indeed, cooperation among 
unequal is problematic because there is always the incentive for one of the parties to defect 
from cooperative arrangements that perpetuate the status quo, as the poor is not satisfied with 
the existing distribution of resources and the rich can easily abandon any arrangement with 
low costs. Moreover, the rich will prevent and crush any form of cooperation and association 
among the poor to maintain its political and economic privileges. So, according to this view, 
cooperation and social capital did not develop in the South because feudal relations and 
concentration of power in the hands of local landowners prevented it. 
Almagisti (2016) provides further arguments to explain the differences in endowments of 
social capital among Italian regions, in particular considering pre-unity Veneto and Tuscany.  
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In Veneto, the strong identification in Venetian Republic has lead people to develop a sense 
of extraneousness towards institutions after the Republic dissolution. In particular, Venetian 
Republic built its social capital through different means, a strong religious orientation, the 
development of a set of symbolic elements aimed at arousing the identification with the 
Republic’s government, and the myth of internal peace as a form of legitimation of Venetian 
aristocracy. The loss in identification in institutions and the preponderant role of the Church 
involved the rise of family as the central social body. The family was the central social body 
that contributed to the production of social capital, and fiduciary relationships rarely 
overcame familiar ties. This social capital was steeped in faith in the clergy (Almagisti, 2016).  
Tuscany, on the other hand, was characterized by a relative continuity in institutional setting. 
Since 18th Century, territories of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany were subject to a political 
reformative attempt which is peculiar with respect to whole Europe (Almagisti, 2016).  
On the economic side, free trade and sharecropping characterized Tuscany. Lorraine 
dynasty’s strong political interventionism comprised the construction of a modern market 
system, with greater freedom of contract; sharecroppers maintained strong fidelity 
relationships with owners, and such ties were strengthened by patronal philanthropism and 
common peasant sense (Almagisti, 2016). This kind of economic relationships fostered social 
capital and strong relations with local institutions. 
As we have previously seen, Felice (2007) identify important discrepancies among Italian 
regions in the years immediately after unification, and in other studies (Felice, 2010, 2011 and 
2015) includes social capital as one of the factors that can help explaining the north-south 
divide. Some studies explore empirical causality linking social attitudes to institutions and 
economic development in Italian case.  
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) argue that social capital is a central factor explaining 
Italy’s financial development. They use electoral participation and blood donations as 
measures of social capital, and find that high social capital areas are characterized by a higher 
access to institutional credit, use of checks and investment in stock. 
Differently from evidence at present day, research on social capital as a factor of Italy’s 
regional long run growth has developed only recently. 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) investigate the legacy of medieval free city-state 
experience of the Middle Ages and find that cities that experienced self-government in the 
Middle Ages have more civic capital today, measured by number of non-profit organizations 
per capita, existence of an organ donation organization and frequency of children’s cheating 
on a national examination. Consistent with Putnam’s conjecture, they find that Northern cities 
that experienced a period of independence in early Middle Ages have significantly higher 
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levels of civic capital today by all three measures. For example the number of voluntary 
associations is 25% higher. The authors use an instrumental variable strategy, by using the 
presence of a bishop before year 1000 and strategic military position as predictors for free-
city status.    
In his recent working paper, Cappelli (2015) provides estimates of social capital across the 
country’s sixty-nine provinces at ten-year intervals between 1871 and 1911. Three indexes are 
computed in order to measure social capital, the first two based on charitable institutions and 
mutual aid societies, the third computed as a measure of trust starting from crime rates. These 
indexes provide the first systematic assessment of social capital disparities across Italian 
provinces in years 1871-1911. Interestingly, the study find a limited impact of social capital 
on economic development, measured by industrial growth and socioeconomic well-being, 
while human capital seems to have driven the process of Italy’s regional divergence before 
the Great War.  
In this part of the work we investigate both political participation and “civic engagement”, 
using different outcomes. The following results add empirical evidence to the picture of 
heterogeneity in the development of social capital in Italy, by investigating long-term social 
capital development in Italy before unity, by using regression discontinuity design.  
First, we test whether greater demand for secularity of the state in Papal State territories come 
together with greater political engagement, whether the experience of inefficient institutions 
in pre-unity states in Southern Italy has lead people to develop a greater attention towards 
political participation.  
Our outcomes of interest are voter turnouts in 1974 and 2011 referendum, expressed as the 
ratio between voters and people eligible to vote.  
As a measure of “civic engagement” we investigate the presence of no-profit organization. 
We use as outcomes the number of no-profit organizations and the number of volunteers in 
them, both weighted for the population census at the municipality level. 
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3.3.1 Political participation – voter turnout 
 
 
After having assessed that former Papal States affiliation increased the proportion of votes 
favourable to divorce in 1974, I am willing to test if it has increased also participation rates. 
My second outcome of interest regards 2011 referendum instead. The popular referendum of 
June 12 and 13, 2011 asked four questions about the repeal of laws concerning the 
privatization of water services (two questions), nuclear energy, and a provision exempting the 
Prime Minister and the Ministers from appearing in the court. All the four referendum were 
accepted, and the four laws repealed.  
Table 6 shows results for the effect of Papal States affiliation on voter turnout in 1974. Table 
7 shows results for voter turnout in 2011. In both tables, columns (1), (2), (3) show results for 
each considered boundary: Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and 
Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Municipality level controls are included in each regression. 
 
 
 
Table 6: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on voter turnout in 1974 referendum 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Voters 1974 North South Tuscany 
        
Papal States 0.0169*** 0.0512*** -0.0029 
 
(0.003) (0.013) (0.007) 
Distance -0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Observations 446 463 393 
R-squared 0.310 0.422 0.174 
controls YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses built 
before 1900, class age controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on voter turnout in 2011 referendum 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Voters 2011 North South Tuscany 
        
Papal States 0.0130* 0.0360*** 0.0245 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.016) 
Distance 0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance -0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Observations 723 726 265 
R-squared 0.392 0.138 0.115 
controls YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls, faith in local institutions, ratio of regional educational expenses on 
Italian GDP. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Results provide evidence of a greater voter turnout in former Papal States territories both in 
1974 and 2011 with respect to Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia and Duchies and Kingdom of 
the two Sicilies. This regression includes local institution controls. Notable differences in the 
number of observations among different borders are due to the different optimal bandwidth 
size. 
The coefficients are highly significant: the coefficient for Papal State against Kingdom of the 
two Sicilies is significant at 1% level in both years, and so is the coefficient against northern 
Italy in 1974. Significance declines at 10% level for the coefficient indicating Papal States 
territories against Kingdom of the two Sicilies in 2011.  
A higher voters turnout in former Papal States municipalities with respect to Kingdom of 
Lombardy-Venetia can be explained as, according to Almagisti (2016), local realities 
developed different types of social capital over the centuries. In Veneto for example, family 
has absolute centrality, and social capital is built mainly upon family ties and smaller 
communities, while there is less cooperative attitude towards institutions after the experience 
of dissolution of Venetian republic.  
In Tuscany, on the other hand, the disrepute of political institutions that characterizes other 
parts of Italy does not come true (Almagisti, 2016), and institutional mechanisms and political 
tradition has fostered a good attitude towards local institutions and social participation. 
Indeed, the coefficient for Tuscany is not significant, but of negative sign. 
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A positive effect of former Papal States affiliation on political participation exists also with 
respect to former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies municipalities, even though inefficient 
institutions characterized both states, still rooted in feudal rules and social structures. A 
positive effect of Papal States affiliation on political participation can be interpreted as a 
reaction to the experience of a government that embedded both political and spiritual power. 
Our hypothesis is that people living in those municipalities have developed and transmitted 
from one generation to another a greater attention towards the participation to political 
process as a way to actively be part of the shaping of institutions.  
Interestingly, taking into consideration the southern border, the effect of former Papal States 
affiliation is larger for 1974 referendum with respect to 2011 referendum, showing that people 
in those municipalities were even more interested in participating in a political discussion 
concerning ethics and expressing themselves in favour of divorce, as seen in the previous 
results. This result is coherent to our hypothesis of a reaction against the imposition of 
religious precepts on all the society. 
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3.3.2 Civic engagement  
 
 
 
Table 8 and 9 show results for our measures of civic engagement, concerning no profit 
organizations. The two outcomes considered are per capita number of no profit organizations 
with volunteers and number of volunteers over population. 
 
Table 8: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on per-capita no profit organizations 
 
Table 9: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on number of volunteers over local population 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Volunteers North South Tuscany 
        
Papal States -0.0438*** 0.0273*** -0.0510** 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.024) 
Distance -0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Observations 1,623 854 334 
R-squared 0.265 0.195 0.350 
controls YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses built 
before 1900, class age controls, faith in local institutions, ratio of regional educational expenses on Italian GDP.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) 
No profit organizations North South Tuscany 
        
Papal States -0.0013*** 0.0012** -0.0017* 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Distance -0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Observations 1,920 772 348 
R-squared 0.213 0.209 0.403 
controls YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls, faith in local institutions, ratio of regional educational expenses on 
Italian GDP.  Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Our results about civic engagement seem to support Putnam’s theory (1993), as overall 
differences exist between northern and southern regions. Such differences may be the result of 
even more ancient historic contingencies, starting from 11th and 12th century.  
If we believe our model, we are identifying only the effect of institutions that characterized 
pre-unity States, in 18th and 19th century. In particular, the effect of pre-unity institutions is 
that municipalities belonging to former Papal States territories have less civic engagement 
than northern regions and Tuscany, but more civic engagement than southern regions. 
Coefficients are highly significant, at 1% and 5% for Papal States versus North and South, at 
5% and 10% for Papal States against Tuscany. 
Putting together all the pieces might not be easy. Previous results about 1974 referendum and 
religious marriages give us the idea that municipalities that were affiliated to Papal States 
have developed greater attention towards the secularity of the State. Also, in these 
municipalities people participate more to the political process, at least in vote regarding social 
issues. Given these results, we may consider former Papal States municipalities “less 
religious” today. As regards civic participation however, we cannot exclude that a positive 
effect on engagement in no profit associations is driven by religion.  
Religious participation and church attendance constitute an important place in which people 
develop civic skills by entering in contact with the rest of the community. Anthropology, 
sociology, experimental psychology, and experimental economics have collected over the 
years evidence on so-called “religious prosociality” (Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008 for a 
review), that is the idea that religion facilitates acts that benefit others at a personal cost.  
Congregations can mobilize their members for civic involvement in a number of ways. First, 
when clergy and other religious leaders stress the importance of reaching out to those who are 
in need during sermons, homilies, teachings, or prayers (Brewer, Kersh and Petersen, 2003, 
Wuthnow, 2002, 2004). Secondly, congregations informally encourage civic engagement 
through supplying personal friendship networks that provide social incentives to be active 
(Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Third, congregations expose people to important 
information about civic engagement in communities by hosting speakers from social service 
and community agencies and by including announcements about civic activities in religious 
service programs (Brewer et al., 2003, Chaves, 2004, Chaves et al., 2002). Fourth, 
congregations cultivate skills that are transferable to civic efforts outside of congregations 
since they offer opportunities for members to participate in a range of leadership activities 
that involve writing letters, planning meetings, giving presentations, and attending meetings 
where decisions are made (Cavendish, 2000, Verba et al., 1995).  
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However, Beyerlein and Hipp (2006) prove that there are at least two conditions under which 
congregations influence active involvement in civic organizations. These are the type of 
congregation activity in which members participate and the context in which the activity 
occurs. The authors find evidence of significant effect of congregational activity beyond 
religious service on civic participation and different effects of different religious traditions, 
with a positive effect of Catholicism on social engagement. 
The higher presence of churches and other religious structures may have favoured to a certain 
degree social interactions among people living in former Papal States municipalities, and 
these social interactions may have generated greater civic consciousness, developing social 
capital skills and social participation. Although in our results about marriages and abortion 
these municipalities show less attachment to religious principles, accordingly to the argument 
proposed by Beyerlein and Hipp (2006), other types of congregational activities linked to 
religious structures may have fostered social skills and participation.  
The extent to which religion is implicated in human cooperation remains open to scientific 
debate (Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008).     
Another interpretation of our results might be that social engagement and political 
participation have grown together, as a way of contributing to the pursuing of a better society 
and as a reaction in a lay direction to the experience of a government that had also spiritual 
authority. In this case, human prosociality would be fostered by the cultural spread of reliable 
secular institutions, such as courts, policing authorities, and effective contract-enforcing 
mechanisms, contributing to the development of a secular moral authority. Tuscany in this 
sense is clear evidence. Indeed, there are many examples of modern, large, cooperative and 
not very religious societies, such as those in Western and Northern Europe, that nonetheless 
retain a great degree of intragroup trust and cooperation (Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008).    
In both cases, signs of a persistence of pre-unity institutions show up in our results, and in 
particular the experience of Papal States shows to impact the social capital of the considered 
communities. Further research with other outcomes could enrich the discussion on the 
complex framework of social capital in Italy, regarding for example religious attendance or 
involving more detailed data on no profit organizations in Italian municipalities. 
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3.4 Education 
 
  
In the third part of the work I discuss our results on educational attainment.  
We chose it as our last outcome of interest because education has been discussed in the 
literature in its relationships with religiosity and social capital, and so completes our 
framework of discussion. 
First of all, education can affect individuals’ preferences and behaviour, and can also impact 
economic development indirectly if it leads to secularization, democratization and enhanced 
civic participation. The relationship between education, religion or secularization has been 
widely discussed.  
Many philosophers and social scientists from Durkheim to Weber have argued that increased 
levels of education would diminish the need for religious adherence, because if education 
improves cognition and the ability for critical thinking, more educated people should be less 
likely to believe in supernatural forces, reducing religiosity (Mocan and Pogorelova, 2014). 
However, bias due to omitted variables cause many cross-sectional studies to provide 
contradictory evidence, that is a positive relation between education and religiosity 
(Iannaccone, 1998).  
Recent studies overcome the problem through different techniques. Becker, Nagler and 
Woessman (2014) construct a unique panel dataset of advanced-school enrolment and 
Protestant church attendance in German cities between 1890 and 1930 and find that while 
cross-sectional estimates replicate a positive correlation, in panel models where fixed effects 
account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity education, but not income or 
urbanization, is negatively related to church attendance. Moreover, in panel models with 
lagged explanatory variables, educational expansion reduces church attendance. 
Moran and Pogorelova (2014) use compulsory schooling reforms in 11 European countries as 
a source of exogenous variation and show that exposure to these education reforms indeed 
increased the years of completed education. By employing micro data from the European 
Social Survey, they analyse how individuals’ propensity to identify themselves as religious 
and the extent of their religious activities are impacted by their education levels. They find 
consistently large negative effects of schooling on self-reported religiosity, social and solitary 
religious acts (religious services and frequency of praying). Moreover, increased mandatory 
years of schooling reduces individuals’ propensity to believe in luck and horoscopes.  
Cesur and Mocan (2014) using a unique survey of adults in Turkey find that an increase in 
educational attainment due to an exogenous secular education reform decreased women’s 
  57 
propensity to identify themselves as religious, lowered their tendency to wear a religious head 
cover and increased tendency for modernity. 
On the other hand, the relationship between social engagement and education is puzzling.  
Coleman (1988) first modelled the relation going from social to human capital, by 
demonstrating the effect of social capital in the family and in the community in aiding the 
formation of human capital. Coleman used remaining in high school until graduation versus 
dropping out as measure of human capital. Both social capital in the family and social capital 
outside it, in the adult community surrounding the school, showed evidence of considerable 
value in reducing the probability of dropping out of high school. In other words, greater social 
capital fosters demand for education.  
Accordingly, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1997) find that the effect of 
trust on schooling outcomes is quite strong, as one standard deviation increase in trust raises 
the percentage of high-school graduates in the population by one-half of a standard deviation, 
and school adequacy by one-third of a standard deviation.  
More recently, Fan (2006) analyses a framework in which social capital, identified in religion, 
affects children’s education, à la Coleman. Fan develops a model in which people’s religious 
participation are determined by the concern for their children’s human capital accumulation as 
well as their religious beliefs. Religious capital is considered as conductive to children’s 
education and moral development, and a household’s religious participation enhances the 
social capital for the creation of the children’s human capital. 
At the same time, conversely education could be a channel of development of social capital, 
causing reverse causality. The main argument in this direction starts from the assumption that 
social trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create 
regular expectations of regular and honest behaviour (Fukuyama, 1995). This set of common 
regular behaviour is created through repeated interactions in voluntary organizations. 
Individuals learn to trust each other by meeting and interacting on a voluntary basis, for 
example in schools (Bjornskov, 2009). Schooling has a socialization effect, which in the last 
resort could induce individuals to trust and engage in voluntary activity. Higher learning 
implies that individuals become better informed and better at interpreting perceived 
information, as well as becoming more conscious of the consequences of actions taken by 
themselves and others. Indeed, education is one of the most important predictors of many 
forms of social and political engagement (Helliwell and Putnam, 1999). 
These arguments will help us in discussing the results of our regressions investigating 
educational outcomes.  
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We include education as the last outcome of interest, and four variables are considered, one 
for each level of qualification in 2001 at the municipality level: 
- literacy rate, computed as the ratio of illiterates over total population; 
- primary school qualification rate, computed as the ratio of people with a primary or lower 
secondary school qualification over total population; 
- secondary school qualification rate, computed as the ratio of people with an upper 
secondary school qualification over total population; 
- university qualification rate, computed as the ratio of people with a university degree 
(Laurea) over total population. 
 
Tables 10 to 12 show the effect of Papal States affiliation on the four outcomes, for all three 
borders considered. Municipality level controls are included in each regression.   
 
 
 
Table 10: effect of Papal States affiliation on qualification rates (versus Kingdom of Lombardy-
Venetia and Duchies) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
North Illitterates 
Primary Lower 
Sec 
Upper 
Secondary University 
          
Papal States 0.0048*** -0.0160*** 0.0046 0.0010 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Distance 0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Observations 1,487 905 905 1,062 
R-squared 0.199 0.401 0.285 0.453 
controls YES YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls, faith in local institutions, ratio of regional educational expenses on 
Italian GDP. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: effect of Papal States affiliation on qualification rates (versus Kingdom of the two Sicilies) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
South Illiterate 
Primary Lower 
Sec 
Upper 
Secondary University 
          
PapalState -0.0036** 0.0277*** -0.0118** -0.0031 
 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) 
Distance -0.0000*** 0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PapalStateDistance 0.0000** -0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Observations 971 627 755 577 
R-squared 0.259 0.215 0.165 0.242 
controls YES YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls, faith in local institutions, ratio of regional educational expenses on 
Italian GDP. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
Table 12: effect of Papal State affiliation on qualification rates (versus Grand Duchy of Tuscany) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tuscany Illiterate 
Primary Lower 
Sec 
Upper 
Secondary University 
          
PapalState -0.0007 -0.0323*** 0.0257*** 0.0074** 
 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) 
Distance 0.0000* -0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PapalStateDistance -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Observations 331 337 348 428 
R-squared 0.181 0.389 0.324 0.403 
controls YES YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls, faith in local institutions, ratio of regional educational expenses on 
Italian GDP. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Evidence for the northern border is conflicting. The coefficient for the ratio of illiterates is 
positive and significant at 1% level, indicating that municipalities that used to be part of Papal 
States have higher illiteracy levels. At the same time, the coefficient for primary and lower 
secondary school qualification is negative and significant.  
Because the coefficient for secondary school is not significant, we are not able to say which 
one of the following is true: if the coefficient for upper secondary school was positive, then it 
would mean that although there are more illiterates in former Papal States municipalities, 
people that started schooling reached higher levels of education, and that would also 
compensate for lower primary qualification rate; if the coefficient was negative, then it would 
mean that actually fewer people in former Papal States municipalities managed to complete 
primary or lower secondary school. 
Considering only the two significant coefficients for illiterates and primary and power 
secondary qualification, we tend to interpret the results as lower demand for education in 
former Papal States municipalities. 
Things change when considering the comparison with the Kingdom of the two Sicilies. 
Former Papal States municipalities have lower illiteracy rates, the coefficient being significant 
at 5% level, and higher primary-lower secondary school qualification. At the same time, 
former Papal States municipalities show to have lower upper secondary school qualification 
rates. In other words, it seems that in former Kingdom of the two Sicilies municipalities there 
are more illiterates, but people that started schooling reached higher levels of education. 
Overall, the interpretation of these results is not straightforward, but apparently we cannot 
exclude a higher demand for education in former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies municipalities 
with respect to Papal States ones.  
As regards Tuscany border, Papal States affiliation has a positive effect on upper secondary 
qualification rates and university degree rates. Both coefficients are significant, at 1% and 5% 
level respectively.   
Historiography has highlighted the inadequacy of pre-unity regimes in terms of education, 
although such inadequacy can be considered a direct consequence of more general economic 
and social structures. Considering the inefficiency of educational systems also in Papal States,  
it is hard to think of a positive long lasting effect of these institutions on modern educational 
attainment. Therefore, the results of our comparison on the Tuscany border are surprising.  
A possible explanation of the positive effect of Papal States affiliation on educational 
attainment, in a similar way to previous outcomes, is a reaction to centuries of inefficient 
institutions. Once better institutions are established, after Italian unification, citizens residing 
in the former Papal States developed higher demand for education. The same holds for former 
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Kingdom of the two Sicilies, which were also characterized by inefficient institutions and 
poor educational system. 
Further arguments can be found in the attitude towards religion in former Papal States 
municipalities. Our results on ethics, abortion and religious marriages give us evidence of 
lower religiosity in these municipalities. Coherently with a view of positive association 
between education and secularity (Becker, Nagler and Woessman, 2014; Mocan and 
Pogorelova, 2014), less religious municipalities should also have greater levels of educational 
attainment.  
However, this argument has a couple of weaknesses to consider. First, it is not clear whether 
in this case greater consciousness about the need for secular institutions has lead people to 
increase demand for education, or reversely education has fostered secularity, as discussed by 
most of the literature. Second, Tuscany is historically and culturally characterized by an anti-
clerical attitude as well.   
Finally, we can integrate our discussion with previous results about social capital. We found 
evidence of greater social capital of former Papal States municipalities with respect to 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.  
A model as the one developed by Coleman (1988), which assumes a relationship going from 
social capital to human capital, is not always applicable in our results.  
The model is applicable for the northern border, where municipalities with higher social 
capital, as predicted by our model, have also higher educational attainment. 
Considering Papal States and Tuscany border instead, our results show that former Papal 
States municipalities have less social capital in terms of vote participation and civic 
engagement, but higher demand for education. Conversely, with respect to Kingdom of the 
two Sicilies former Papal States municipalities have more social capital but less demand for 
higher levels of education. For these two cases a model à la Coleman is not applicable. 
Coherence between results about social capital and education would strongly support our 
hypothesis of development of greater demand for education once better institutions are 
established, but this conflicting evidence leaves open space for further debate on how to 
explain this empirically significant effects of pre-unity institutions, which shows to be there in 
any case.  
  
 
  
  62 
4. Robustness checks  
4.1 Within-region studies 
 
 
A lot has happened in Italian history in more than a hundred and fifty years after unification. 
Italy has developed economically and socially, has gone through two world wars, and has 
become one of the founder members of the European Union.  
As stated before, one of the characteristics of Italy that has attracted the attention of scholars 
is its regional heterogeneity, with different paths of economic development and great variety 
of local economic systems. Not only among different regions, but even at the provinces’ level 
or strictly territorial there are peculiar differences: take for example the case of industrial 
districts in northern and central Italy. 
The study of Italian regional heterogeneity is interesting in terms of economics of growth, but 
at the same time is challenging. In particular, in a research like this one the assumption of 
being able to identify the effect of institutions that ceased to exist more than a century and a 
half ago is crucial, but also fragile. The differences among Italian regions are the result of 
course of starting conditions at the time of unification, but mainly of different economic 
programs that succeeded over the years, political differences, and local institutions 
differences. 
In order to correct identify the effect of pre-unity institutions we should be able to control for 
all these aspects in our models. We should then think to restrict our comparison groups of 
municipalities, for example comparing municipalities in the same modern region, or even 
province, that is crossed by a historic pre-unity border.  
The pre-unity borders follow mostly modern regional borders, with few exceptions, as we can 
see in figure 4, which represents modern regions’ borders on pre-unity states. Red lines 
indicate Papal States border, and they cross modern regions in two cases only, Latium and 
Emilia Romagna. 
We restrict our sample, while methodology remains the same. Regression Discontinuity 
design is implemented, controlling for distance and interaction between distance and a 
dummy for Papal States. Optimal bandwidth around the border is computed for each outcome 
using Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) strategy implemented in Stata.  
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Figure 4: modern Italian regions and pre-unity states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By comparing municipalities in Latium and Emilia that are on the opposite side of pre-unity 
borders, we are able to refine our analysis with even more convincing evidence.  
In the following page, figures 5 and 6 represent in detail the municipalities on historic borders 
in Emilia Romagna and Latium, in a sample 40 km buffer. 
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Figure 5: 40 km buffer around historic Papal States border, Emilia Romagna 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: 40 km buffer around historic Papal States border, Latium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  65 
4.1.1 Ethics 
 
 
Tables 13 and 14 show robustness checks results on the two outcomes considered to 
investigate the attitude towards ethical issues. These are the ratio of votes favourable to 
divorce in over total votes in 1974 referendum, and the proportion of religious marriages over 
total marriages in 2012. 
 
Table 13: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on proportion of votes favourable to divorce, 
referendum 1974, and number of religious marriages in 2012, Emilia Romagna 
  (1) (2) 
Emilia Romagna Referendum74 Religious Marriages 
      
Papal States 0.0060 -0.0356 
 
(0.016) (0.042) 
Distance -0.0000* 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance 0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   Observations 192 183 
R-squared 0.586 0.270 
controls YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 14: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on proportion of votes favourable to divorce, 
referendum 1974, and number of religious marriages in 2012, Latium 
  (1) (2) 
Latium Referendum74 Religious Marriages 
      
Papal States 0.0624*** -0.1651** 
 
(0.021) (0.064) 
Distance 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   Observations 326 346 
R-squared 0.349 0.091 
controls YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Coefficients for municipalities within Emilia Romagna are not significant, although their sign 
is coherent with our hypotheses of greater acceptance of abortion and lower number of 
religious marriages in former Papal States municipalities.  
Interestingly, coefficients for Latium are significant at 5% level. They represent a higher 
degree of attention towards secularity in former Papal States territories, as former Papal States 
affiliation increases the proportion of votes favourable to divorce and decreases the proportion 
of religious marriages.  
These results constitute important evidence supporting our hypotheses of long lasting effects 
of pre-unity states, in particular regarding culture and demand for secularism of the State in 
modern days. 
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4.1.2 Social capital 
 
 
Tables 15 to 18 replicate our previous experiments on outcomes measuring social capital. 
First, voter turnout in 1974 and 2011 is investigated as a measure of political participation. 
Then the number of per-capita no profit organizations and volunteers is used as measure of 
civic engagement. 
 
Table 15: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on voter turnout in 1974 and 2011 referendum, 
Emilia Romagna 
  (1) (2) 
Emilia Romagna Voters 1974 Voters 2011 
      
Papal States 0.0070 -0.0087 
 
(0.005) (0.010) 
Distance 0.0000 -0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   Observations 163 226 
R-squared 0.569 0.421 
controls YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 16: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on voter turnout in 1974 and 2011 referendum, 
Latium 
  (1) (2) 
Latium Voters 1974 Voters 2011 
      
Papal States 0.0328* 0.0385*** 
 
(0.017) (0.013) 
Distance 0.0000*** -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance -0.0000* 0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   Observations 267 332 
R-squared 0.412 0.128 
controls YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on per-capita no profit organizations and 
volunteers, Emilia Romagna 
 
 
 
Table 18: effect of historic affiliation with Papal States on per-capita no profit organizations and 
volunteers, Latium 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) 
Emilia Romagna 
No profit  
Organizations Volunteers 
      
Papal States 0.0001 -0.0156* 
 
(0.000) (0.009) 
Distance 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   Observations 322 322 
R-squared 0.595 0.444 
controls YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  (1) (2) 
Latium 
No Profit  
Organizations Volunteers 
      
Papal*States 0.0002 0.0049 
 
(0.001) (0.012) 
Distance 0.0000 0.0000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance -0.0000* -0.0000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   Observations 334 344 
R-squared 0.189 0.191 
controls YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses 
built before 1900, class age controls.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Like in regressions regarding ethical themes, as for political participation further evidence on 
effect of historic Papal States affiliation comes from our within Latium study.  
The coefficient for 1974 referendum is significant at 10% level, while the one for 2011 
referendum is significant at 1% level, providing very robust results. Both coefficients are 
positive, proving evidence of a higher political participation in municipalities that experienced 
centuries of institutions mixing secular and spiritual power.  
Limited evidence is found instead regarding civic engagement. The only significant 
coefficient is for the number of volunteers over total municipal population in Emilia 
Romagna. Results however are coherent with previous tests on the northern border. The 
coefficient tells us that in former Papal States municipalities there are fewer volunteers, 
testifying a lower social capital. The explanation for this might be that municipalities in Papal 
States, which were organized in institutions of feudal kind, had not the possibility of 
developing social capital and forms of civic engagement (Putnam 1993). 
Both coefficients for our experiment in Latium are not significant. 
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4.1.3 Education 
 
 
Table 19 and 20 sum up our results about education for all qualification levels. For each 
qualification level, proportion over municipal population is computed. 
 
 
Table 19: effect of Papal States affiliation on qualification rates, Emilia Romagna  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Emilia Romagna Illitterates Primary Lower Sec Upper Secondary University 
          
Papal States 0.0006 0.0031 0.0057 0.0058*** 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
Distance -0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Papal States*Distance 0.0000*** -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Observations 318 261 261 289 
R-squared 0.414 0.523 0.430 0.643 
controls YES YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses built 
before 1900, class age controls.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
Table 20: effect of Papal States affiliation on qualification rates, Latium 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Latium Illiterate Primary Lower Sec Upper Secondary University 
          
PapalState -0.0047* 0.0349*** -0.0108 -0.0067* 
 
(0.002) (0.011) (0.009) (0.003) 
Distance -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PapalStateDistance 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Observations 361 312 336 301 
R-squared 0.248 0.276 0.245 0.251 
controls YES YES YES YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, dimension, urbanisation, houses built 
before 1900, class age controls.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Significant evidence is found also in our experiments about educational attainment. 
As for Emilia Romagna, municipalities that used to be affiliated to Papal States have a higher 
proportion of people who got a university degree, the coefficient being significant at 1% level. 
The coefficient proves a higher demand for education in these municipalities. 
As for Latium, former Papal States municipalities have a lower proportion of illiterates, 
coefficient being significant at 10% level, and higher proportion of people with a primary or 
lower secondary qualification, significant at 1% level. Also, the coefficient for university is 
negative and significant at 10% level. These results are similar to when considering the whole 
Papal States – Kingdom of the two Sicilies border.  
Overall, it seems that in former Kingdom of the two Sicilies there are more illiterates, but 
people who started an education path managed to complete higher schooling levels, as 
confirmed by the significant coefficient for university graduation rate. Like in previous 
experiments about education, we cannot exclude the interpretation of a higher demand for 
education in former Kingdom of the two Sicilies, which was also characterized by an 
inefficient educational system.  
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4.2 Double RDD: an introduction 
 
 
In many Regression Discontinuity Design settings exogenously imposed cutoffs on several 
assignment variables define a set of different treatments. Papay et al. (2011) generalize the 
standard Regression Discontinuity Design to include multiple forcing variables, modelling 
simultaneously discontinuities that arise when multiple criteria determine placement into 
several different treatment conditions.  
There are indeed many situations in which values on different forcing variables assign 
participants to a set of different treatment conditions, think for example about public 
education tests with cutoffs in different subjects, or public policy programs with multiple 
eligibility criteria.  
In this last part of the work, we start discussing the implementation of a double RDD into a 
geographical setting. In particular, we consider jointly Papal States, Kingdom of the two 
Sicilies and Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Our two forcing variables are distance from the border 
between Papal States and Kingdom of the two Sicilies and distance from the border between 
Papal States and Grand Duchy of Tuscany. The treatments that these two variables determine 
are, like in previous standard RDD, being part of former Papal States against either Kingdom 
of the two Sicilies or Tuscany.    
We adapt the model presented by Papay et al. (2011) in the following way: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑆 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑇 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑇 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑇 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑆 
+𝛽7𝑃𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑆 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑆 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑇 + 𝛽9𝑋 + 𝜇 
 
where PT indicates affiliation to former Papal States versus Tuscany, PS affiliation to former 
Papal States versus Kingdom of the two Sicilies, distT is the distance from the Tuscany 
border and distS the distance from Kingdom of the two Sicilies border. X contains the same 
municipality level controls used in previous regressions, including controls for local 
institutions. 
Alternatively to simple distance from the borders, one might think of measuring latitude and 
longitude of all municipalities and develop a multi-dimensional RDD in those measures, like 
in Dell (2010). 
As in previous experiments, optimal bandwidth around the two borders is computed using 
Imbens and Kalyanaraman’s (2012) strategy.  
In the following page, Figure 7 graphically represents our setting. 
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Figure 7: optimal bandwidths around Papal States borders for double RDD 
 
 
 
 
 
As we can see in the picture, bandwidths are such that almost all municipalities in Papal 
States are considered, and therefore our local linear regression is very close to a parametric 
procedure. 
We apply our model to the proportion of religious marriages and see if results are coherent 
with previous models. Table 21 sums up our results. 
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Table 21: effect of former Papal States affiliation on the proportion of religious marriages over total 
marriages in 2012, double RDD design 
 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Religious Marriages 
    
PT 0.3739*** 
 
(0.062) 
PS -0.1789** 
 
(0.077) 
distT 0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) 
distS 0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) 
PT*distT -0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) 
PS*distS 0.0000* 
 
(0.000) 
PT*distS -0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) 
PS*distT 0.0000*** 
 
(0.000) 
  Observations 1,379 
R-squared 0.112 
controls YES 
Controls include: population, area, mountainous area, height, seismicity, 
dimension, urbanisation, houses built before 1900, class age controls, faith 
in local institutions, ratio of regional educational expenses on Italian GDP. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
 
 
In our previous regression on religious marriages results were not significant as regards 
Kingdom of the two Sicilies and Grand Duchy of Tuscany, while in this new model the 
estimated coefficients are highly significant and coherent with our previous hypothesis. 
In particular, municipalities in territories that used to be part of Papal States have a higher 
proportion of religious marriages with respect to municipalities in former Grand Duchy of 
Tuscany and lower proportion of religious marriages with respect to municipalities affiliated 
to former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The coefficients are significant at 1% level and 5% 
level respectively, and are of similar magnitude to the coefficients obtained in the standard 
RDD. 
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Overall, the model adds evidence to out hypothesis of a long-term effect of pre-unity 
institutions on attitude towards religion and ethics. Former Papal States territories have 
developed a preference towards civil marriages as part of a greater attention towards the 
secularity of society, but the effect does not overcome the anticlerical political and cultural 
legacy that instead characterizes Tuscany municipalities.   
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Conclusions 
 
 
The aim of this paper is trying to assess whether Italian pre-unity institutions have had long 
lasting effects on modern municipalities. The experiment is inspired from a recently 
developed field of literature which investigate long lasting effects of historic contingencies on 
economic development, such as Becker et al. (2016), Bukowski (2015), Dell (2010). 
Italy constitutes a unique context for its framework of regional heterogeneity in terms not 
only of paths of economic development, but also of social and cultural characteristics. These 
differences are the results of years of different experiences and contingencies, and identifying 
the origins of the differences among modern regions is challenging, as designed models 
should be able to control for all factors that produce heterogeneity.  
We use Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) as our methodology. Thanks to RDD we are 
able to compare modern Italian municipalities that are close enough to historic borders, and 
therefore they are comparable, controlling for other factors, except for the fact that they have 
been subject to different institutions in Centuries preceding unification.  
Thanks to a software using GIS technology we were able to reproduce historic borders and 
compute the distance of each municipality from them. Local linear regression is implemented, 
and optimal bandwidth around historic borders is computed using Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman’s (2012) strategy for each regression.  
We provided empirical evidence for different scopes of long-lasting effects of pre-unity 
institutions on modern Italian municipalities. 
We first started discussing the attitude towards ethical matters, arguing that the experience of 
an inefficient government in Papal States territories that mixed secular and spiritual power has 
fostered a reaction that went beyond politics to impact also ethical principles in people living 
in those territories. Indeed, former Papal States municipalities have a greater proportion of 
votes favourable to divorce in 1974 referendum and a lower proportion of religious marriages 
over total marriages in 2012, proving evidence of higher demand for secularization of the 
state and the opposition towards the imposition of a religious ethics on the whole society. 
Secondly, we investigated social capital, as most scholars have shown it is as an important 
source of discrepancies among Italian regions. The effect of pre-unity institutions on social 
capital is heterogeneous and coherent with historical contingencies in those States.  
We consider voter turnout in 1974 and 2011 referendum as a measure of political 
participation. Municipalities that used to be affiliated with Papal States have significantly 
higher vote participation in both years with respect to Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia and 
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Duchies and Kingdom of the two Sicilies. We argue that this is the effect of different 
institutional experiences in Centuries preceding Italian unification, and consider these results 
as evidence to Almagisti’s (2016) hypothesis that different parts of Italy developed different 
forms of social capital. Moreover we argue that the opposition towards Papal States’ 
institutional structure, which has transmitted also in social matters as shown before, has lead 
people to develop a greater attention towards political participation as a way to participate to 
the shaping of institutions. 
We don’t find significant evidence of different political participation between Papal States 
municipalities and Tuscany. We argue that Tuscany is historically characterized by political 
and economic institutions that fostered the construction of social capital characterized by faith 
and acceptance of institutions, and participation in them.  
We also investigate the number of per capita no profit organizations and proportion of 
volunteers on municipal population as measures of civic engagement. Results seem to support 
Puntam’s (1993) hypothesis, as we find significant differences in civic engagement mainly 
between northern and southern regions. In particular, municipalities belonging to former 
Papal States territories have less civic engagement than northern regions and Tuscany, but 
more civic engagement than southern regions. 
In the third part of our research we investigate educational attendance, using as outcomes the 
proportion of municipal population having a certain qualification rate. Educational systems 
were badly organized and poor in resources in all pre-unity states, with perhaps the only 
exception being Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia under Austrian domination. Therefore, it is 
hard to imagine a positive persistent effect of those institutions.  
Former Kingdom of Lomabardy-Venetia affiliation is associated with significantly lower 
illiteracy levels and higher primary and lower secondary qualification rates. Being also 
insignificant the coefficient for upper secondary education and university, we interpret these 
results as higher educational attainment in northern regions. This is the only case where we 
may suppose a positive lasting effect of pre-unity institutions, as a consequence of Austrian 
experience.   
With respect to Kingdom of the two Sicilies, former Papal States affiliation is associated with 
significantly lower illiteracy levels, higher primary and lower secondary and lower upper 
secondary qualification rates. Therefore, it seems that even if former Kingdom of the two 
Sicilies affiliation is associated with higher illiteracy levels, people that started education 
reached higher schooling levels.  
Surprisingly, Papal States affiliation increases educational attainment in our experiment 
around the border with Tuscany. This result is hardly explainable considering at least two 
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perspectives. First, higher educational attainment in former Papal States municipalities is 
hardly explainable considering a positive relationship between attention towards secularity 
and demand for education (Becker, Nagler and Woessman, 2014; Mocan and Pogorelova, 
2014), as Tuscany itself is characterized by an anti-clerical attitude. Secondly, it is 
explainable neither through a social capital argument, considering a positive relationship 
between social capital and education (Coleman, 1988; Fan, 2006; Bjornskov, 2009; Helliwell 
and Putnam, 1999), as previous experiments showed evidence of greater social capital in 
Tuscany.  
Considering the experiments about education on the three borders jointly, there is no great 
evidence of a greater demand for education in former Papal States municipalities. There is 
rather evidence of heterogeneous effects interacting among them, at the institutional and 
social capital level. 
Further within region experiments were made, in the only two cases where modern regions 
are crossed by historic borders, in order to restrict even further our sample of comparable 
municipalities and control for other possible sources of heterogeneity. Further evidence comes 
from our multiple RDD model that considers jointly two Papal States borders. These 
experiments prove the robustness of our experiments and in most cases confirm previous 
results.   
Our experiment on Italian pre-unity states supports the idea that former institutions can leave 
a legacy even after generations of common statehood (Becker et al., 2016). In particular, we 
proved evidence of an effect on cultural norms, attitudes towards institutions, and on social 
capital. The interactions of these effects with other outcomes, such as educational attainment 
need to be further investigated. 
Anyways, evidence proves that good governance can generate a cultural basis that facilitates 
collective action into the future (Becker, 2016), but also bad governance can affect the 
cultural basis that will determine the behaviour of collective action.  
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